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Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions 
Harvard Journal of Law & Gender, Vol. 38, #1 (forthcoming, 2015, in Symposium, 
Religious Accommodation in the Age of Civil Rights) 
Ira C. Lupu1 
 The experience of the past fifty years, culminating in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., is grounds for deep skepticism of any sweeping regime of 
religious exemptions. Part I of this essay locates the problem in the current legal 
and cultural moment, which includes religious objections to employer-provided 
contraceptive care for women, and religion-based refusals by wedding vendors 
and others to facilitate the celebration of same sex marriages.  Part II broadens 
the time frame to analyze the regimes of religious exemption – federal and state, 
constitutional and statutory -- in which such disputes play out. Such regimes will 
tend to be rhetorically strong and experientially weak, with an occasional outburst 
of religion-protecting vigor. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, analyzed in Part III, 
demonstrates yet again that application of vague, general standards for 
adjudicating religious exemption claims cannot satisfy values associated with the 
rule of law. The key terms in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act are 
perpetually contested and subject to infinite, result-oriented manipulability. Part 
IV concludes with a prediction that Burwell v. Hobby Lobby will suffer the same 
fate as earlier, apparently strenuous embraces of religious exemptions.  
Ultimately, it will wither on a malnourished vine. 
INTRODUCTION 
Everyone has intuitions about exempting religious objectors from legal 
duties with which others must comply.  Almost no one thinks that American law 
would be truly and adequately respectful of religious freedom if the law offered 
no avenue to accommodate deeply held, conscientious religious commitments.  
Moreover, almost no one thinks that legislatures or administrators can be fully 
trusted to produce an optimum mix of well-deserved, practice-specific 
accommodations -- that is, to do justice over time in the mix of grants and denials 
1 F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law Emeritus, George Washington University.  My thanks to the 
organizers of the Symposium on Religious Accommodations in the Age of Civil Rights for the invitation to submit a 
paper for the published version; to Bob Tuttle for very helpful comments on an earlier draft of the piece; and to 
Christina Hobbs, a member of the class of 2016 at George Washington University, whose research assistance 
contributed significantly.  The errors are mine. 
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of such accommodations.  Power advantage, manipulation and control of agenda-
setting, and religious prejudice are likely to be all too prominent in the legislative 
process, and frequently in administrative processes as well. 
With this set of intuitions, the choice to involve an impartial judiciary, 
obliged to hear claims of all, in the enterprise of religious accommodation seems 
to be salutary.  Case by case adjudication, under general standards, guided by 
reliance on precedent and analogical reasoning, appears to offer hope for a just 
process of determining when religiously motivated practices should be shielded 
from negative legal consequences. 
That ease of first glance extends to substance as well as to process. When 
confronted with examples, most people can identify religious claims that appear 
highly exemption-worthy, because denying them appears to greatly intrude on 
faith while producing little or no public benefit.  Consider the example of a school 
that forbids the wearing of hats, and its consequent refusal to accommodate a 
child whose faith requires him or her to wear a head covering.  And everyone can 
identify claims that seem obviously NOT exemption-worthy, because granting 
them appears to produce a risk of significant harm to others.  Consider the 
example of an airline passenger who asserts that her faith requires her to carry a 
deadly weapon at all times. 
Having constructed categories of easy cases, defined primarily (though not 
exclusively) by risk of harm, everyone will eventually arrive at close or difficult 
cases with respect to granting accommodations or exemptions.  Perhaps we are 
unsure of the significance of certain practices within a particular faith; perhaps 
the risk of harm they create is in a non-trivial mid-range.  Consider the example of 
a soldier who asserts that she can never work the evening shift on a military base 
because, she claims, she has religious duties at home during the evening hours.  
Her religious duties may be difficult for outsiders to her faith to understand, and 
accommodating her faith commitments inevitably will impose extra evening work 
on others. 
In these kinds of cases, judges typically will want to know more about the 
religious practice, its significance to its adherents, and the harms to others that 
may follow from accommodating the practice.  As information thickens, and the 
number of variations proliferates, judges will soon be forced to confront a set of 
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conflicting intuitions, not only about the cases in the middle ground, but also 
about which cases fall into each of three categories – yes, no, maybe.  They will be 
uncertain about so many of the relevant variables – the faith, the role of the 
practice within it, the religious significance of accommodation or non-
accommodation, and the costs that accommodation may inflict on government 
interests or private third parties.   At a level deeper, judges may also be 
concerned about the sincerity of exemption claimants, the incentives that a pro-
exemption ruling may create for insincere claims, the intrusiveness of the process 
for weeding out insincere claims, and so on.  Alas, judges will find no satisfactory 
template in existing or past law for rigorous and principled evaluation of these 
multiple variables. Eventually, as cases accumulate, we will be left with a pattern 
of results that cannot be defended as a whole. 
Adjudication of religious exemptions, under any set of general criteria, 
repeatedly reveals this dilemma.  We can opt for a judicially administered, 
generalized exemption regime that will in particular cases result in what some 
observers will see as “good outcomes,” all-things considered.  Over time, 
however, that regime is highly likely to be unprincipled, ad hoc, inconsistent, 
subject to manipulation, and frequently biased for or against certain faiths.  
Moreover, to the extent the regime permits judges to determine the religious 
weight and significance of certain practices, the regime unconstitutionally 
entrusts the state with questions that it is constitutionally incompetent to 
answer.2  In order to avoid those problems, which involve serious concerns of 
justice and constitutional limitation, we can opt to eliminate any such regime of 
adjudication.  That would limit religion-specific exemptions of particular practices 
to those produced by legislation and administration, subject to Establishment 
Clause limitation.3 In practice, no other systemic choice exists. 
2 See generally Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Secular Government, Religious People 226-232(Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Pub. Co., 2014) (hereafter, “Lupu & Tuttle”); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Forms and Limits of 
Accommodation:  The Case of RLUIPA, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1907 (2011). 
3 Those limitations tend to be under-noticed and highly significant.  For an excellent elaboration of the 
Establishment Clause limitations on discretionary religious accommodations, see Frederick Gedicks and Rebecca 
Van Trammel, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of 
Religion, 49 Harv. Civ. Rts. Civ. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming, Summer 2014); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 216-225. 
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My approach to this set of issues is Holmesian, grounded in experience 
rather than abstract logic.4  Part I locates the piece in the moment – that is, in our 
current situation of conflict over religious accommodations with respect to 1) the 
Affordable Care Act’s requirement of contraceptive coverage in health insurance, 
and 2) legal duties to refrain from discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.  Part II turns to the historical evidence that a generalized exemption 
regime will be rhetorically strong, experientially weak, and relentlessly ad hoc in 
its results.  Part II.A. addresses the experience from 1963-1990 under a 
constitutional regime of free exercise exemptions. Part II.B. analyzes the record of 
adjudication under federal RFRA, both before and after City of Boerne v. 
Archbishop Flores5 (1997), which invalidated RFRA as applied to the states.  Part 
II.C. compares the experience under state RFRA’s in the same twenty-plus year 
period. Part III then analyzes the Contraceptive Mandate Cases in light of the 
general regime concerns that this history illustrates, and shows how the various 
opinions in those cases perfectly illustrate the general dilemma of adjudicating 
religious exemptions under a set of general standards.  Part III concludes with an 
assessment, drawn from this experience over half a century, of the implications of 
the Contraceptive Mandate Cases for future conflict between religious freedom 
and marriage equality. 
I. Culture Wars and Religious Accommodations  
Through the late winter and spring of 2014, lawyers and scholars focused 
on religious liberty watched with mounting engagement and anxiety as a number 
of parallel battles played out.  The most prominent one, which had roiled 
American law and politics over the prior few years, involved the Affordable Care 
Act’s requirement that employer-provided health insurance include all forms of 
female contraception.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
4 Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr. The Common Law (1881) (Little, Brown, & Co.):  “The life of the law has not been 
logic; it has been experience.” To be sure, there have been powerful voices behind the view that a regime of free 
exercise exemptions is normatively indefensible.  See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Religious 
Freedom and the Constitution (Harv. U. Press 2007) at 78-120; Frederick Mark  Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: 
The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 555 (1998); William P. Marshall, 
William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 308 (1991). I remain 
normatively agnostic about such exemptions.  My argument is that they have proven to be institutionally 
impossible.  For a very different approach, leading to a similar conclusion, see Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, The 
Impossibility of Religious Freedom (Princeton U. Press, 2007). 
5 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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Stores, Inc.6 (hereafter “Hobby Lobby”) has now resolved several aspects of those 
disputes.  But, as discussed in Part III, the decision leaves open a number of 
crucial questions, including most urgently the question of the legal validity of the 
existing accommodation for religiously affiliated non-profit institutions.7  
Despite understandable public expectations to the contrary, the most 
important legal authority in the cases concerning the contraceptive mandate has 
never been the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.  No court has ever 
found that the mandate violates the Free Exercise Clause.  Instead, the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act8 of 1993 (hereafter “RFRA” or “federal RFRA”) has been 
the center of legal gravity for this body of litigation.  But the dominance of RFRA 
has meant all along that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise 
Clause, in an earlier era, has haunted the scene. 
Here is the brief, operative provision of federal RFRA:9  
(a) In general 
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion 
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as 
provided in subsection (b) of this section. 
(b) Exception 
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if 
it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest. 
RFRA’s general prohibition on government burdening religious exercise 
appears to be a strict command (“shall not”); RFRA’s exception looks familiar to 
6  573 U.S. _ (2014); 2014 U.S. LEXIS 450582 (No. 13-354, June 30, 2014) (decided together with Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No, 13-356). 
7  Compare Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F. 3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014) with Little Sisters of the Poor Home for 
the Aged v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014), rev’g, No. 13–cv–2611–WJM–BNB, 2013 WL 6839900 (D. Colo. Dec. 
27, 2013).  See also Wheaton College v. Burwell, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13a1284_ap6c.pdf.  There also remains the question of the 
application of the Hobby Lobby decision to for-profit firms that object to covering all female contraceptives, not 
only those considered by the employer to be abortifacients.  See the Supreme Court’s orders to the Circuit Courts 
to reconsider cases, linked and summarized here: http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/07/wider-impact-of-hobby-
lobby-ruling/, involving RFRA challenges to coverage of all pregnancy prevention services. No one expects those 
decisions to be resolved against the objecting firms.  
8 42 U.S.C. secs. 2000bb et seq. 
9 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000bb-1. 
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constitutional lawyers, well-acquainted with the language of compelling interests 
and least restrictive means, both of which ordinarily signal a strong presumption 
against the government.  As elaborated below, however, the narrative of RFRA’s 
enactment and subsequent interpretation maps erratically at best on the uses of 
these concepts elsewhere in constitutional law.  
For lawyers and academics who have tracked the entire mass of 
contraceptive mandate litigation over the past few years, the many RFRA 
questions raised in these cases have defied any easy path to resolution.  In 
considerable part, the resistance to clean answers has not simply been the 
product of the cognitive dissonance produced by the culture wars between 
conservative religious values and women’s reproductive freedom, although that 
dissonance has surely played a part. For even the most careful and open-minded 
of lawyers, these cases presented a set of difficult and inter-related questions. 
Here is a list, inevitably incomplete:10 
1. Is a corporation a “person” within the meaning of RFRA’s operative 
provision?  How can an artificial person exercise religion?  Are business 
corporations a different sort of artificial person than religiously affiliated 
non-profit entities, such as universities, hospitals, and charities? How 
can these entities be “persons” if business entities are not? 
2. What counts as a “burden” under RFRA, and what makes a burden 
“substantial”?   May courts look at the religious weight and significance 
(that is, the religious cost of compliance with the law) of the asserted 
burden, or are they limited to examining the secular costs of non-
compliance? Does the employer’s choice to drop health coverage and 
pay a tax make the secular burden of the mandate insubstantial?  Does 
legal pressure that may lead an employer to facilitate the “sins” of 
others, who make independent behavioral choices, constitute a 
substantial religious burden on the employer?  
10 For an impressively comprehensive identification and analysis of the issues raised in Hobby Lobby, see Martin 
Lederman, Compendium of Posts on Hobby Lobby and Related Issues, March 17, 2014, available at 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/search?q=contraceptive+mandate. For the best appraisal of the Establishment Clause 
issues at stake in the litigation, see Gedicks & Van Trammell, note 3, supra; Schwartzman, Tebbe, and Schragger, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-establishment-clause-and.html; 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-and-establishment-clause.html; 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-and-establishment-clause_9.html. 
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3. Which interests are compelling enough to justify imposition of such 
burdens?  Are these interests to be measured in gross (“women’s 
health,” or “gender equality”), or only as implicated by particular 
exemption claims (that is, by the marginal cost to the government or 
affected third parties of recognizing exemptions)?  If an employer 
refuses to cover certain goods in a health insurance policy, is the harm 
any greater than the cost to employees of self-insuring for those goods?  
Why should the government be so strenuously interested in avoiding 
that kind of cost-shifting? 
4. When, if ever, is a less restrictive means unavailable to achieve this kind 
of government interest?  In particular, when the interest is in providing 
some good (contraceptive goods and services, for example) rather than 
avoiding some privately inflicted harm (an act of violence, for example), 
can’t the government always provide the good itself rather than 
imposing a duty on private parties to provide that good? 
What was striking about the conversation that flowed across these discrete 
issues was the near total lack of a common frame of reference for discussing 
them.  On every question, advocates talked past each other.  When Hobby 
Lobby’s supporters asked why the Green family should be made to leave their 
religious values at home when they went into business, the government’s 
supporters replied by asking why the Greens should be permitted to impose their 
religious values on employees and their families.  Each side emphasized its own 
framing, and tended to ignore the opposing frame.11  
This was not merely an artifact of rhetorical strategy and legal/political 
positioning.  Rather, as Part II below explains, this was a thoroughly predictable 
feature of the conversation about the content and application of the standards 
that supposedly guide religious exemptions.  The endless plasticity of those 
standards invites widely disparate lines of argument for advocates, and equally 
disparate modes of resolution for judges. 
11 Professor Tuttle and I played our own parts in this game, though our first joint post on the case to some extent 
straddled the sides.  See Lupu & Tuttle, http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/symposium-religious-questions-and-
saving-constructions/ (siding with Hobby Lobby on the question of substantial burden, but arguing that the 
government should prevail). 
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As the Contraceptive Mandate Cases made their way through the federal 
courts, a related cultural conflict exploded.  Across the heartland of America, 
proponents of civil equality for same sex couples dueled legally and politically 
with religious objectors to that equality.  One manifestation of the conflict 
involved attempts in Kansas, Arizona, Mississippi, and other states to legislate 
about religious freedom.  The proposed Kansas law, entitled “AN ACT concerning 
religious freedoms with respect to marriage,”12 would have very specifically 
precluded the imposition of any legal duty on an “individual or religious entity” to 
provide any services or goods related to any marriage or to the celebration of any 
marriage, or any legal duty to “treat any marriage . . . as valid.”13  The proposed 
law defined “religious entity” to include privately held, for profit businesses as 
well as non-profit entities.14 
No one had any doubt about the source of political energy that was driving 
the proposed Kansas law, which passed one House of the state legislature.  In the 
weeks leading up to its consideration, federal district courts in Utah, Virginia, 
Hawaii, and Oklahoma had ruled that the 14th amendment required the State to 
allow same-sex couples the same rights to marry as opposite-sex couples.15   The 
proposed Kansas law was an effort to pre-emptively bar the application of anti-
discrimination norms, which at the time did not even exist in Kansas law, to 
businesses, public employees, and others who objected on religious grounds to 
same sex unions.  As such, the proposal triggered a firestorm of criticism, and the 
state Senate eventually balked and refused to enact the measure.16 
The bleeding from Kansas quickly spilled over into a controversy about 
proposed amendments to Arizona’s Free Exercise of Religion Act.17 Although 
neither the Act nor the proposed amendments said anything about weddings, 
12 Kansas House of Representatives, Session of 2014, Bill No. 2453, By Committee on Federal and State Affairs, 
entitled “AN ACT concerning religious freedoms with respect to marriage,” available at 
http://www.kslegislature.org/li/b2013_14/measures/documents/hb2453_01_0000.pdf. 
13 Id. at Section 1. (c). 
14 Id. at Section 3. (a). 
15 Amsterdam v. Abercrombie, No. 13–00649 SOM–KSC, 2014 WL 689764 (D. Haw. Feb. 19, 2014); Bishop v. United 
States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014); 
McGee v. Cole, No. 3:13–24068, 2014 WL 321122 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 29, 2014); Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13–CV–750–
H, 2014 WL 556729 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014); Evans v. Utah, No. 2:14CV55DAK, 2014 WL 2048343 (D. Utah May 19, 
2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d 2014 WL 2868044 (No. 13-4178, 10th Cir. June 
25, 2014). 
16 Wichita Eagle, http://www.kansas.com/2014/02/18/3297322/kansas-senate-kills-controversial.html. 
17 http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/51leg/2r/bills/sb1062p.pdf. 
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marriages, sex, or gender, the proposal immediately drew fire as an attempt to 
achieve the same ends as the Kansas proposal.  The amendments would have 
explicitly allowed for-profit business corporations to raise state RFRA claims and 
defenses,18 and would have clarified that such defenses were available in private 
lawsuits as well as actions brought by the State of Arizona.19  Critics of these 
amendments successfully painted them as being “licenses to discriminate” against 
those in same sex relationships, and Governor Brewer – under great pressure 
from business interests and threatened with loss of the Super Bowl in Phoenix in 
February 2015 – vetoed the bill.20 
A few weeks before oral argument in the Contraceptive Mandate Cases, 
and a few weeks after the political explosion over religious freedom legislation 
proposed in Kansas and Arizona, a less well-noticed conflict played out in the 
State of Mississippi.  The state’s Republican leaders introduced and advocated for 
a Religious Freedom Restoration Act.21  The proposed Act made no mention of 
marriage, same sex or otherwise.  Moreover, Mississippi (like many other states) 
neither recognizes same sex marriage nor prohibits discrimination against LGBT 
people in the distribution of goods and services. Nevertheless, the political 
conflict over the measure, which eventually became law in a form weaker than 
originally proposed,22 centered precisely on the question of whether the proposal 
would license that kind of discrimination, in the context of wedding celebrations 
or otherwise.23 
 In the skirmishing over the Mississippi RFRA, two groups of legal scholars 
sent letters to the state’s legislative leaders with respect to the law’s merits and 
likely impact.   The signatories of the first of those letters included a group that 
had been advocating for the rights of vendors to refuse on religious grounds to 
18 Id. at section 41-1493 (5). 
19 Id. at section 41-1493.01, D. 
20 http://www.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20140226arizona-jan-brewer-1062-statement.html. 
21 The bill as introduced is here: http://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/documents/2014/html/SB/2600-
2699/SB2681IN.htm. 
22 The enacted version is here: http://legiscan.com/MS/text/SB2681/2014. 
23 See, e.g., Emily Pettus, Associated Press, Mississippi Governor Signs Religious Freedom Bill that Could Allow Anti-
Gay Discrimination, available at  http://www.lgbtqnation.com/2014/04/miss-governor-signs-religious-freedom-
bill-that-could-allow-anti-gay-discrimination/. 
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provide goods and services to same sex wedding ceremonies.24 This 
communication, under the letterhead of Professor Douglas Laycock, made 
absolutely no mention of weddings, or discrimination.  After describing the 
pattern of state RFRAs and the content of Mississippi constitutional law, the letter 
went on to say that “the standard that [the proposed Mississippi RFRA] creates 
now applies to the federal government and more than 30 of the states, and was 
the standard for the entire country from 1963 – 1990.  In the places where this 
standard applies, it has not been interpreted in crazy ways that have caused 
problems for those jurisdictions; if anything, these laws have been enforced too 
cautiously.”25 
The second letter,26 to which I was a signatory, read in tone and content as 
if it were addressed to an entirely different legislative proposal. The letter 
emphasized the potential reliance on a state RFRA to discriminate against LGBT 
people and others, and it highlighted the strenuous recent enforcement of federal 
RFRA, upon which Mississippi RFRA (and that of many other states) is modeled.  In 
particular, the letter emphasized that the terms of RFRA “are tilted heavily in 
favor of religious freedom claims and against competing civil rights concerns.  .  . 
. . Recent decisions by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts highlight 
[federal] RFRA’s significant weighting in favor of religious interests, and against 
whatever government interests are on the other side.”27  The letter went on to 
emphasize the (recent) ease of satisfying the requirement of “substantial burden” 
on the “exercise of religion;”28 because “any sort of fine or legal sanction imposed 
24 Many of their communications to legislators on this subject are available here: 
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2009/08/memosletters-on-religious-liberty-and-samesex-
marriage.html. 
25 Letter from Professor Douglas Laycock et al.  to Representative Philip Gunn, Speaker of the Mississippi House of 
Representatives, Feb. 11, 2014, available at ____ (copy on file with author).  The signatories included Professor 
Richard Garnett, Thomas Berg, and Christopher Lund, all of whom had urged the legislatures of other states to 
create wedding vendor exceptions to state law duties to serve without discrimination based on sexual orientation.  
See materials archived at Mirror of Justice blog, note __ supra. 
26 Letter by Religious Liberty Scholars Opposing Mississippi Bill 2681, http://www.thirdway.org/publications/795. 
The signatories included several scholars, myself included, who had earlier urged the Illinois legislature to defeat a 
legislative proposal (backed by the Laycock group) that would protect the freedom of vendors to refuse on 
religious grounds to serve same sex weddings.  http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/files/five-law-professors-against-
changing-sb-10.pdf. 
27 Letter by Religious Liberty Scholars Opposing Mississippi Bill 2681, http://www.thirdway.org/publications/795 
(emphasis added). 
28 Id., quoting Senate Bill 2681, Section 1. (5) (a). 
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for conduct that the actor asserts is motivated by his religious faith will be 
sufficient to show such a burden.”29 
 Moreover, as the letter argued, “once a showing of substantial burden has 
been made, the requirement in [the Bill] that the government show that 
application of a law is ‘essential to further a compelling state interest’ and the 
‘least restrictive means’ 30 to do so is likely to be very difficult to satisfy.  Federal 
RFRA imposes a nearly identical standard on the federal government.  In the most 
prominent federal RFRA decision to date . . ., the Supreme Court unanimously 
ruled that the federal government had not sufficiently proven that it had a 
compelling interest in stopping importation of a hallucinogenic drug (hoasca tea), 
banned by the federal Controlled Substances Act.31 . . .” 
“Suppose [the proposed Mississippi RFRA] becomes law.  If a person raises a 
RFRA defense to a charge under state or local anti-discrimination law (whether 
already enacted or enacted after [the RFRA]), that person would likely include as 
part of his defense that other, non-objecting persons provide the same or similar 
goods and services.  Such a person would assert that the existence of alternative 
providers renders application of the law not “essential” as to him.  . . . [I]f state 
courts follow the model of [recent federal decisions], the state’s RFRA might 
protect exactly that kind of discrimination.”32 
Was one of these groups of scholars being deceptive or dishonest in its 
arguments to the Mississippi legislature?  I make no such claim.  The scholar-
proponents of Mississippi RFRA had a complex agenda, which included a general 
concern for religious freedom; this concern extended to empowering at least 
some religious objectors to same sex marriage.  And, as elaborated in Part II.C., 
below, these proponents quite accurately asserted that a number of state RFRA’s 
had been weakly enforced.  The scholar-opponents had a more focused agenda – 
flagging a RFRA as a potential threat to anti-discrimination laws in general, and as 
constraint on full marriage equality in particular.  And the opponents accurately 
29 So will any threat of lost government benefits, “exclusion from government programs,” or lost “access to 
governmental facilities” as a result of religious exercise. Id. quoting Senate Bill 2681, Section 1. (4) (a). 
30 Id., quoting Senate Bill 2681, Section 1. (5) (a)(i) – (ii).  Note also Section 1. (4) (b): “’Compelling governmental 
interest’ means a government interest of the highest magnitude that cannot otherwise be achieved without 
burdening the exercise of religion.” 
31 Letter by Religious Liberty Scholars Opposing Mississippi Bill 2681, http://www.thirdway.org/publications/795., 
citing Gonzales v. O Centro, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
32 Id. 
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asserted that federal RFRA had become more potent over the past several years, 
especially in light of the Contraceptive Mandate Cases.  The proponents had no 
interest in flagging the recent surge in strength of federal RFRA; that development 
undercut their claim that a state RFRA was likely to do some good with little risk 
of harm. 
What was striking to those who were simultaneously monitoring the 
Contraceptive Mandate Cases and the Mississippi RFRA fight was the conceptual 
overlap between the federal RFRA questions in the former and the potential 
questions that the latter might eventually generate.  Can a business corporation 
be a “person” who exercises religion?  Is a requirement to provide (or not 
discriminate in the provision of) certain goods and services a “substantial burden” 
on the provider’s religious exercise, when the provider objects to use of the goods 
by others for certain purposes?  Does the government have a compelling interest 
in disallowing all exemptions from such obligations, even if alternative methods of 
provision of these goods are likely to be available? 
In the middle of this political debate in Mississippi, Professor Thomas Berg 
(one of the proponents of the state RFRA and a contributor to this Symposium) 
commented in a blog post that the atmosphere for proponents of RFRAs had 
become “toxic.”33 Indeed.  As Professor Berg well knows, the moment’s toxicity 
was a function of the marriage equality battle.  But the problem presented by 
RFRAs, or any other mechanism for adjudication of religious exemptions under 
general standards, is not momentary, and is not limited to the context of same 
sex marriage or anti-discrimination law more generally.  The problem is territorial 
and longstanding – such regimes invite sympathy for the plight of religious 
objectors, but they also invite indeterminacy, result-orientation, and the exercise 
of official power over questions that are wisely walled off from state resolution by 
the Constitution.  
II. A Brief History of Religious Exemption Regimes 
33 http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2014/03/the-scholars-mississippi-letter-rfras-in-
general-are-now-bad.htmlMirror of Justice (“ . . . politically this is an impossibly toxic time to propose a state 
RFRA.”) The time is anti-toxic for those Mississippi businesses whose owners oppose anti-gay discrimination, and 
are publicizing their opposition to what they believe the state RFRA represents.  See “Business Owners Challenge 
Anti-Gay Law, http://www.washingtonblade.com/2014/07/11/business-owners-challenge-anti-gay-miss-law/. 
(showing anti-discrimination seal that such business owners are putting on their shop doors.) 
 12 
                                                          
Like the subject of time, a narrative history of religious exemption regimes 
does not invite brevity.34   My thesis, however, depends on explication of this 
history, and the brief version seems best for present purposes. 
A. The Law of the Free Exercise Clause. Prior to 1963, the Court had never held 
that the Free Exercise Clause, standing alone, supports an exemption from 
general laws.  In 1878, the Court held in Reynolds v. United States,35 the Mormon 
polygamy case, that the Clause protects religious belief, but does not exempt 
religiously motivated action from otherwise valid laws.  As the Court put it in 
Reynolds, “To permit [religious excuse for violation of legal duty] would be to 
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, 
and, in effect, to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”36 
Constitutional law remained steadfastly true to that proposition for the 
next eighty-five years.  Prior to 1963, all of the victories for religious claimants in 
the Supreme Court involved assertions of rights that protected secular and 
religious acts alike.  Several of these decisions turned on parental rights under the 
due process clause;37 others, most notably the second Flag Salute Case38 and 
Cantwell v. Connecticut,39 depended upon the presence of free speech interests.  
When the Court confronted claims resting on the Free Exercise Clause alone – 
that is, claims for religious exemptions from duties applicable to others -- the 
claimant invariably lost.40 
In 1963, the Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in Sherbert v. Verner41 signaled 
a significant change in the law of the Free Exercise Clause.  Sherbert involved a 
claim under South Carolina’s unemployment compensation statute, by a Saturday 
Sabbatarian that she had good cause to refuse employment that required 
Saturday work.  Following the Court’s then-recent decision in Braunfeld v. 
34 Cf. Stephen Hawkings, A Brief History of Time (Bantam, 10th anniversary ed., 1998). 
35 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
36  Id. at 167. 
37 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
38 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
39 310 U.S. 296 (1940).  We trace the story of Barnette and Cantwell in more detail in Lupu & Tuttle, Secular 
Government, note 2 supra, at 183-189. 
40 See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Minnersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
41 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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Brown,42 which had rejected a claim for free exercise exemption from Sunday 
Closing Laws, the decision employed the precise language of “substantial 
burdens” and “compelling interests” that, thirty years later, became the 
centerpiece for the statutory embrace of religious freedom.   
Sherbert was far more ambiguous than present-day restorers make it 
appear; the decision turned in part on the discrimination in South Carolina law in 
favor of Sunday Sabbatarians.43  Moreover, Sherbert did not “exempt” the 
claimant from anything.  The Court did not hold that Mrs. Sherbert could refuse 
work without good cause and still collect unemployment benefits; rather, it ruled 
that her religious commitments constituted good cause as a matter of the state’s 
constitutional duty to avoid burdening religious freedom.  Sherbert is a decision 
about a constitutionally mandatory extension of benefits, rather than an 
exemption from general norms. 
 Wisconsin v. Yoder,44 decided in 1972, is the true and only lynchpin of the 
restoration movement.  Yoder held that the Free Exercise Clause exempted adult 
members of the Old Order Amish from the obligation to send their children to 
school until the age of 16.  Yoder is indeed an exemption case, and it is expressly 
limited to religiously motivated claims to such an exemption;45 on its own terms, 
it rests on the Free Exercise Clause, and not on a religion-indifferent doctrine of 
parental rights.  This is precisely what makes Yoder different from the Second Flag 
Salute Case,46 where a religion-indifferent freedom from compelled speech, 
rather than religious conscience, is doing all the work.   
Like Sherbert, Yoder also utilized the language of substantial burden and 
compelling interests, but a close examination of the opinion reveals it to be an 
exercise in even-handed balancing of interests, with close attention to the harms 
at the margin of each side’s concerns.  The Court carefully analyzed, in light of 
facts in the record, the beliefs of the Old Order Amish concerning their obligations 
42 366 U.S. 599 (1961).  I examine the rise of the compelling interest test in Free Exercise cases, and its connection 
to seemingly analogous standards in free speech cases, in Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens 
on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 933 (1989).  
43 374 U.S. at 406 ((discriminatory treatment of Saturday Sabbatarians in state law compounds the constitutional 
problem).  
44 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
45 Id. at 215-216 (distinguishing claims based on secular philosophy from those based on religious belief).  These 
themes are elaborated further in Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 192-195. 
46 West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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to maintain the continuity of their religious community, and the likely effects on 
that community if the Amish are not exempted from the obligation to send their 
14-15 year olds to school.47 And the Court likewise examined the precise impact 
of an exemption on the state interests -- having minimally educated, 
independent, self-reliant citizens -- that Wisconsin claimed were at stake.48 Only 
after a detailed comparison of the effects on both sides of this equation did the 
Court resolve the case in favor of the Amish.  
 Between Yoder and Employment Division v. Smith, the path of free exercise 
decisions in the Supreme Court is an inconvenient embarrassment to “restorers.”  
The only victories for free exercise claimants in the Supreme Court involved 
explicit discrimination against religion49 or denials of unemployment 
compensation; indeed, two of the three unemployment cases involved 
Sabbatarians,50 similar to Sherbert.  The third, Thomas v. Review Board of 
Indiana,51 involved conscientious objection by an employee to involvement in the 
production of armaments.52  Like Sherbert, these subsequent unemployment 
compensation decisions are also “false exemption” cases.  Each of them requires 
extension of the concept of “good cause” to refuse proffered employment, rather 
than an exemption from the requirement of good cause.  As a “true exemption” 
case, Yoder is the cheese – it stands alone. 
 The smattering of unemployment decisions to one side, the decade of the 
1980’s demonstrated that the Supreme Court was utterly unprepared to keep the 
promise that Yoder had apparently made.  In case after case, the Court found 
ways to distinguish Sherbert-Yoder and rule against the free exercise claimant.  
These rulings fell into three, basic categories.  First, the Court held that the 
47 406 U.S. at 217-218.  That inquiry – the effects of non-exemption on religious concerns – is deeply problematic, 
because it forces a reviewing court to consider ecclesiastical questions, as well as sociological questions of 
communal survival over time.  The government’s courts are constitutionally incompetent to address the 
ecclesiastical questions, see Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), 
and institutionally ill-equipped to address the sociological ones.  The Yoder opinion revealed little sign of 
awareness of either of these concerns, but they came home to roost in the years that follow. See Lupu & Tuttle, 
note 2 supra, at 43-73; 227-232. 
48 406 U.S. at 224-225. 
49 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (state may not bar clergy from elected office). 
50 Hobbie v. Unemp. App. Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Emp. Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989). 
51 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
52 Significantly for the Contraceptive Mandate Cases, Thomas appears to solve the dilemma of judicial 
incompetence to resolve ecclesiastical questions by making the claimant the judge of the religious substantiality of 
the burden he asserts. See Part III infra. 
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seemingly strict test of Yoder did not apply in government-controlled enclaves – 
the armed forces53 and prisons.54  The special needs for discipline in such contexts 
generically trumped religious liberty concerns.   
Second, the Court construed the idea of “substantial burdens” to limit it to 
a) coercive impositions in the form of punishments for religiously motivated acts, 
or b) conditions inconsistent with faith commitments on government benefits. As 
the Court elaborated in Thomas v. Review Board:55 “Where the state conditions 
receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or 
where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, 
thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to 
violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be 
indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.”   
 However expansive this idea of “substantial pressure on an adherent to 
modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs” may seem, it nevertheless omits 
some government activity that has profoundly negative effects on faith practices. 
In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association,56 the Court 
notoriously held that the government’s conduct on the public lands, despite the 
severe and deleterious effects of that conduct on Native American sacred sites, 
did not constitute a legally cognizable burden on the free exercise of religion by 
tribes whose sites had been disturbed.57 The ruling in Lyng effectively blocked the 
use of the Free Exercise Clause as a protector of Native American religious rituals 
and practices on the public lands. 
53 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
54 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
55 450 U.S. 707, 717-718 (1981). 
56 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
57 Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).  See also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 
(1986).  For fuller elaboration of Lyng and the conceptual problem of what constitutes a legally cognizable burden 
on the free exercise of religion, see Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise 
of Religion, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 933 (1989).  The conceptual problem is the same under RFRA, which codifies the pre-
Smith test for “substantial burden.”  For an important contribution to analysis of this problem under the Free 
Exercise Clause, see Nomi Stolzenberg, "He Drew A Circle That Shut Me Out": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the 
Paradox of A Liberal Education,” 106 Harv. Law Review 581 (1993)(commenting on the 6th Circuit’s decision in 
Mozert v. Hawkins County School District that compulsory exposure to certain books does not burden the free 
exercise interests of a child or her family). 
 16 
                                                          
Third, in particular contexts, the Court retreated from a Yoder-style 
balancing of precise interests at the margin of each side’s concerns – that is, the 
respective costs of exemption and non-exemption.  Instead, it categorically 
generalized the concept of compelling interest.  In cases involving claimed 
exemption from taxation58 and from anti-discrimination norms,59 the Court 
stopped analyzing claims at the margin of state interests and vindicated the 
government’s wholesale interest in refusing to entertain any exemption claims 
whatsoever.   
Beyond the subjects of taxation and civil rights, a crucial dictum in United 
States v. Lee60 suggested that commercial actors had to comply with generally 
applicable regulatory regimes, and could never successfully assert religious 
exemption claims:61 
“When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a 
matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of 
conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory schemes which 
are binding on others in that activity.”    
Thus, on the eve of Smith, the law of the free exercise clause was defined 
by the fact-bound interest balancing of Yoder, rather than by the presumption of 
unconstitutionality ordinarily associated with the “compelling interest” test. And 
that body of law was deeply qualified by the exceptions and limiting principles the 
Court had identified as ways of evading the Sherbert-Yoder approach.  The 
enclave exclusion, the constrained doctrine of burdens, and the embrace of 
certain interests as categorically compelling all played an important part in 
reinforcing judicial reluctance to hold in favor of religious exemption claimants.   
Moreover, other considerations operated to hinder Free Exercise exemption 
claims in the federal courts. Judges were intuitively hostile to the concept of 
privileging religious objectors, and found ways to limit and reject their claims.62  .  
58 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989). 
59 Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
60 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
61 455 U.S. at 261.  The Lee dictum played a pivotal role in the Contraceptive Mandate Cases. 
62 As Jim Ryan wrote in the period after the decision in Employment Division v. Smith and prior to enactment of 
RFRA, free exercise claims in the halcyon days of Sherbert-Yoder had a dismal track record in the Courts of Appeals 
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For example, lower courts systematically found ways to distinguish Yoder when 
other religious actors sought to remove their children from school.63 Beyond the 
use of fact-specific distinctions in particular contexts, other doctrines operated to 
further limit exemption claims.  These included the rule that the sincerity of free 
exercise claims is subject to examination by judge or jury,64 and the possibility of 
Establishment Clause limitations on the shifting of religion-driven costs to third 
parties.65   
B. Employment Division v. Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  
In Employment Division v. Smith,66 Justice Scalia’s opinion called precise 
attention to the many ways that the courts had breached the promise of Yoder.  
The dispute involved denial of unemployment compensation to drug and alcohol 
counselors who had lost their jobs for “misconduct” – in particular, using peyote 
in the sacraments of the Native American Church. The Court could have easily 
disposed of Smith under the weakened compelling interest test, as a “drug case” 
in which the government’s interests were categorically compelling.67 But the 
Court seized upon the case, which (unlike the earlier unemployment 
compensation decisions) did involve a true claim of exemption from conduct 
norms, as an opportunity to revise the law.  Moreover, Smith did not overrule 
Sherbert, its progeny in cases involving unemployment benefits, or Yoder.  
Instead, it re-rationalized them in ways that significantly limited their scope.68  
Smith transformed Yoder, which had been the exclusive lynchpin of a doctrine of 
religious exemptions, into a decision about hybrid constitutional rights.69 
as well as in the Supreme Court.  James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A Iconoclastic 
Assessment, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1407, 1414, 1417 (1992).  See also E.E.O.C. v. Townley Engineering & Mfg. Co., 859 F. 2d 
610 app. (9th Cir. 1988) (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
63 See Johnson v. Charles City Community Bd. of Educ., 368 N.W. 2d 74, 83-84 (Iowa 1985).  See generally Ira C. 
Lupu, Home Education, Religious Liberty and the Separation of Powers, 67 B.U. L. Rev. 971 (1987). 
64 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
65 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 414-417 (1963) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result); Thomas v. Review 
Board, 450 U.S. 707, 720-726 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
66 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
67 In Smith, Justice O’Connor took precisely this view.  Id. at 903-906 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the result). 
68 The Smith opinion described Cantwell and Yoder as cases involving hybrids of free exercise rights and other 
constitutional rights, and it characterized Sherbert and its progeny as cases involving individualized discretion 
under broad standards of “good cause.” Id. at 881, 884. 
69 Id. at 881. 
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Despite Smith’s thick resonance with a decade of decline in the strength of 
Free Exercise Clause standards, critics vilified the opinion as a sudden and 
dramatic departure from the controlling law of the Clause.70  Armed with that 
rhetoric of unfair, nasty, and constitutionally dangerous surprise, some of the 
sponsors of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act claimed that the Free Exercise 
Clause had long and strenuously protected claims for religious exemptions, and 
that Smith had shockingly and unjustifiably erased that protection.71  After several 
years of legislative tragi-comedy, dominated by opposition to RFRA (as proposed) 
by the very anti-abortion groups that have ridden RFRA hard in the Contraceptive 
Mandate Cases,72 both Houses of Congress passed the Act by wide margins, 73 and 
President Clinton enthusiastically signed it.74  
Like many regulatory statutes, RFRA represents a classic delegation 
problem.  It offered legislators and the President a chance to vote for a general 
good, “religious freedom,” while leaving to others (primarily the judiciary, rather 
than regulatory agencies) the task of interpreting and applying its plastic 
standards.  Almost everyone in the enacting Congress was a fan of religious 
freedom; not a single one stood up and said that members of the Native 
American Church had a constitutional right to use peyote in their sacraments. 
70 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1. 
71 See, e.g., statements of Rep. Steven Solarz (D – NY) and Dean Kelley, National Council of Churches, in Report of 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Committee on Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 
on H.R. 5377 (Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990), available at http://www.house.gov/judicary/2.htm.; 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearing on H.R. 2791 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional 
Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 152-63 (1993)(statement of Nadine Strossen, President, 
American Civil Liberties Union). Some commentators had a more refined and sophisticated view of what had been 
going on.  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at the Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115 (1992) 
(describing the law on the eve of Smith as a Potemkin Village): Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearing 
on H.R. 2791 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. 
152-63 (1993) (statement of Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr.). 
72 The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops originally opposed the Act, out of a concern that it might empower 
women to seek abortions for religion-related reasons if Roe v. Wade were overruled (as many expected was 
imminent at the time).  When the Court reaffirmed the core of Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and Bill Clinton 
prevailed in the 1992 elections, thereby guaranteeing the preservation and expansion of a pro-Roe majority, the 
Conference withdrew its opposition to RFRA.  See Douglas Laycock, Free Exercise and the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 883, TAN 48-49 (1994). 
73 Laycock and Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 209, 210 (1994). 
74  William Jefferson Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2000 
(Nov. 16, 1993). 
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 One of the most elusive and important meta-questions about the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act relates to what it “restored.”  Some of its proponents 
asserted that it restored the law of the free exercise clause on the eve of Smith.75  
But, as described a few paragraphs above, that body of law included 1) the 
exclusion of government enclaves from the Sherbert-Yoder standards; 2) the tight 
interpretation of “burdens” to exclude the physical impact of government 
conduct on worship activities; and 3) the categorical embrace of government 
interests in uniform application of tax rules, civil rights laws, and (arguably) 
regulations of the employment relationship in commercial settings, as exemplified 
in United States v. Lee. 
Writing in 1995, soon after RFRA’s enactment, I flagged the precise set of 
questions about the scope and meaning of statutory restoration of judicially 
created constitutional standards.76  In March of 2014, those questions ripened in 
the Supreme Court. As elaborated further in the discussion in Part III. below of the 
Contraceptive Mandate Cases, Justice Kagan and Paul Clement, counsel for Hobby 
Lobby, squared off during oral argument on the scope of what RFRA restored – in 
particular, whether RFRA codified the Lee dictum about religious actors effectively 
waiving religious objections when entering the commercial sphere.  Justice Kagan 
suggested that RFRA should be construed as if it incorporated by reference the 
pre-Smith constitutional law of free exercise, including the Lee dictum.77  As one 
would expect, Clement leaned on the precise formula in RFRA as the relevant law 
of the statute, and rejected the idea that language used in application of a similar 
constitutional formula in Lee operated to qualify RFRA’s governing norms.78   The 
exchange further highlights the dilemma of RFRA’s indeterminacy; it references 
75 See, e.g., statements of Rep. Steven Solarz (D – NY) and Dean Kelley, National Council of Churches, in Report of 
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, Committee on Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 
on H.R. 5377 (Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990), available at http://www.house.gov/judicary/2.htm.   
76 Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 
171 (1995) (inquiring whether RFRA restored the law of Free Exercise as of the time of Yoder (1972) or as of the 
eve of Employment Division v. Smith in the spring of 1990). 
77 Transcript of oral argument in Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-
2019/2013/2013_13_354, at pp. 3-5.   Writing in 1995, I flagged the precise question that occupied this moment in 
oral argument and later drew attention in the Hobby Lobby opinions.  For a more general elaboration of the issues 
raised by enacted law that uses terms from judge-made constitutional law, see Ira C. Lupu, Statutes Revolving in 
Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1, 56-62 (1993). 
78  Transcript of oral argument in Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby, http://www.oyez.org/cases/2010-
2019/2013/2013_13_354, at pp. 3-5. 
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the “standard set forth in Sherbert . . . and Yoder,”79 without reference to the 
ways that the Court had ignored or weakly implemented that standard in many 
decisions after 1972.  
Litigation under Federal RFRA  
To what extent did RFRA codify or depart from the pre-Smith gloss on the 
Free Exercise Clause? As the law of RFRA developed in the lower federal courts, 
what emerged over time was the view that RFRA had adopted some but not all of 
that interpretive baggage.  Significantly, the Act did not specifically address the 
exclusion of government enclaves from the full protection of the Free Exercise 
Clause, but subsequent interpretations have accepted that RFRA covers prisons80 
and the armed forces.81 The character of those enclaves affects the analysis, 
because certain government interests are stronger in these contexts, but RFRA 
standards nevertheless apply.82   
In contrast to its silence on the status of enclaves, RFRA explicitly adopts 
the judicially created language of substantial burdens and compelling interests.  
Prior to the Contraceptive Mandate Cases, the pre-Smith law with respect to 
those terms became part of RFRA’s gloss. In particular, courts in RFRA cases 
involving public lands repeatedly adopted the “substantial burdens” limitation 
from Lyng.83  With respect to the pre-Smith treatment of certain interests as 
categorically compelling, courts hearing RFRA-based challenges to federal 
taxation continue to adhere to a RFRA policy of rejecting exemption claims in the 
name of tax uniformity.84  Prior to the Contraceptive Mandate Cases, however, 
few if any commercial employers relied on RFRA to seek exemption from business 
79 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000bb(b) (1). 
80 See, e.g., Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F. 3d 468 (2d Cir. 1996).  After the decision in City of Boerne, RFRA no longer 
applies to state or local institutions of confinement, though RLUIPA has filled that gap.  See TAN xxx-xxx infra. In a 
close vote, the Senate rejected an amendment that would have excluded prisons from RFRA.  139 Cong. Rec. 
S14468 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1993).  For earlier discussion of the issue of RFRA in prisons, see S. Rep. No. 111, 103rd 
Cong., 1st sess. 18-38 (1993). 
81 Dep’t. of Def. Instr. 1300.17, Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the Military Services (Jan. 22, 2014), 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130017p.pdf. 
82 This coverage is made explicitly in the Report pf the Senate Judiciary Committee on RFRA. See Report 103-111, 
at pp. 9-12. 
83 See cases cited note ___, infra. 
84 See, e.g.,Thompson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 140 T.C. 173 (T.C. 2013); Moore-Backman v. United States, 
No. CV 09–397–TUC–RCC (BPV), 2010 WL 3342173 (D. Ariz. June 28, 2010). 
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regulation, so the question of RFRA’s incorporation of the Lee dictum was rarely 
(if ever) put to the test. 
The RFRA regime can be fruitfully broken into three periods – 1) enactment 
until the decision in City of Boerne v. Archbishop Flores85 (1993 – mid-1997), 2) 
post-Boerne and pre – O Centro (mid-1997 – early 2006); and 3) post - O Centro 
(early 2006 to date).  In the first period, the Act’s potential impact was greatest, 
because its coverage included all of American law. In the second period, the Act 
effectively covered only federal law, and the Supreme Court had no occasion to 
construe it.  At the outset of the third period, the Court’s opinion in Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Benficente Uniao do Vegetal86 (hereafter “O Centro”) implicitly 
validated RFRA’s coverage of federal law and applied RFRA with surprising force.  
But O Centro, like Yoder a quarter-century earlier, represents an outlier rather 
than a platform for a sustainable regime of free exercise exemptions.  As 
demonstrated by the survey and analysis that follows, RFRA made startlingly 
little impact on the American law of religious freedom before the Contraceptive 
Mandate Cases. 
Pre-Boerne.  The Act became law in 1993, and it applied to all law in the 
U.S. – federal, state, and local – until the 1997 decision in City of Boerne v. Flores87 
held it unconstitutional as applied to state and local law.88  Accordingly, the 
period from 1993 through the City of Boerne decision in 1997 represents the only 
time period in which all of American law was subject to RFRA.   This is significant 
quantitatively, because application to state and local law invited many more 
potential RFRA claims than would be the case under federal law alone.  The 
original scope of RFRA’s application is even more significant qualitatively, because 
inclusion of state and local government swept a different set of contexts, some 
(like public schools) quite religion-sensitive, into RFRA’s ambit.  
After the Court’s decision in City of Boerne, I surveyed ALL of the judicial 
decisions, federal administrative references, and state attorney general opinions 
85 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
86 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
87 City of Boerne v. Archbishop Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
88 Professor Marci Hamilton, who argued successfully for the City of Boerne, remains convinced that RFRA is 
unconstitutional with respect to federal law as well.  Marci Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is 
Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. Penn, J. of Const’l Law 1 (1998); see also Professor Hamilton’s Brief for Freedom 
from Religion Foundation in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13–354, 2014 WL____ (U.S. June 30, 2014). 
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that involved the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  I called the resulting article 
“The Failure of RFRA,”89 because the results showed that the Act had 
accomplished very little.  In particular, RFRA had produced 168 judicial decisions.  
Ninety-nine of these involved litigation by prisoners.90  In those 168 cases, courts 
(primarily but not exclusively federal courts) granted relief in 24, 15 of which were 
prison cases.  Both in and out of prison, the claims prevailed at a rate of about 
15%.  As I wrote at the time, “When one recalls . . . that RFRA had been 
trumpeted as the protection of religion against all the religion-neutral, generally 
applicable rules that would beset it, and that RFRA’s terms appeared to widely 
and stringently protect religious exercise, this record of success seems surprisingly 
tepid.”91  Tepid, for sure, but on reflection perhaps no surprise – Professor Ryan 
had found a similar rate of success for free exercise claims in the federal courts of 
appeals in the decade leading up to Smith.92 
In the period immediately after Boerne, no generalized regime of federal 
law requiring religious exemptions applied to state or local law.  In 2000, after an 
aborted attempt in Congress to enact a new and general protection of religious 
liberty in the states,93 Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”).  As its title suggests, RLUIPA is focused 
on two discrete contexts – land use and institutionalized persons – in which 
proponents persuaded Congress that issues of religious discrimination, 
89 Ira C. Lupu, The Failure of RFRA, 20 U. Ark. at Little Rock L.J.  575 (1998). 
90 Because persons incarcerated for crime are highly litigious and suffer considerable restrictions on all their 
freedoms, including religious freedom, it remains the case that the great bulk of religious freedom litigation in the 
U.S. involves prisoners.  See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, U.S. Sup. Ct. 13-2827, cert granted March 3, 2014 (certiorari to 8th 
Circuit re: Arkansas prison prohibition on prisoners wearing beards).   
91  20 Univ. of Ark. at Little Rock L. Rev., at 592.  As the article demonstrated, the most common maneuver for 
courts to use in ruling for the government was to find that the asserted burden was insubstantial, typically because 
the relevant religious practice was not compulsory as a matter of faith.  Id. at 594-595.  Subsequent amendments 
to RFRA’s definitional section have closed the door to this particular move.  See 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000cc-5 (7) (A) 
(“The term “religious exercise” includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a 
system of religious belief.”) 
92 Ryan, note xx supra, at 1416-17. 
93 The proposal, named the Religious Liberty Protection Act, foundered on the shoals of a dispute about whether it 
would protect religious liberty claims to act inconsistently with anti-discrimination laws.  For discussion, see James 
M. Oleske, Jr., Obamacare, RFRA, and the Perils of Legislative History, 67 Vand. L. Rev. EN BANC 77, 82-87 (2014), 
available at http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/content/articles/2014/03/Oleske_Perils-of-Legislative-
History.pdf. ; Douglas Laycock, Douglas Laycock, Imaginary Contradictions: A Reply to Professor Oleske, 67 Vand. L.  
Rev. EN BANC 89, 91-94 (2014) , available at http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/2014/03/imaginary-
contradictions-a-reply-to-professor-oleske/laycock_response/. 
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insensitivity, and oppression were widespread.  Over the last fourteen years, 
RLUIPA has made a significant difference with respect to both contexts.94    
In state and local institutions of confinement, in particular, RLUIPA filled an 
important gap and has led to thousands of lawsuits.95  Whether or not the pattern 
of decision in these lawsuits has been more principled or consistent than the 
general pattern under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA prior to 1997, I cannot 
say.  The sheer number and variety of prison cases make it nearly impossible to 
fully assess the integrity of this body of law, though a recent filing in the Supreme 
Court suggests that the RLUIPA prison cases are riddled with deep 
inconsistencies.96  
One distinctive vice of the prisoner cases, however, under RFRA or its 
successor RLUIPA, is their tendency to invite evaluation, by prison administrators 
and reviewing courts, of the significance of particular religious practices.  As my 
colleague Robert Tuttle and I have discussed elsewhere, the prison cases have on 
a number of occasions involved “religious experts” who testify or advise on the 
relative significance of a religious practice, such as prayer frequency, religious 
diet, or showering before prayer.97  This is unsurprising as a matter of institutional 
control, but constitutionally disturbing.  As an elaborate line of decisions show, 
the official evaluation of religious meaning or significance is beyond constitutional 
94 I have not surveyed or appraised RLUIPA land use cases.  The Becket Fund website lists important decisions from 
that context, see http://www.becketfund.org/?s=RLUIPA.  My colleague Bob Tuttle has appraised the ways in 
which the Constitution alone might have done the work of RLUIPA in land use cases, see Robert Tuttle, How Firm a 
Foundation? Protecting Religious Land Uses After Boerne, 68 George Washington L. Rev. 861 (2000). Professor 
Hamilton has been an implacable and relentless foe of RFRA, RLUIPA, and all such generic religion-protecting 
regimes.  See Marci Hamilton, God vs. the Gavel:  The Perils of Extreme Religious Liberty (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014); and her website, http://rfraperils.com/.   Whatever the merits of her views of RLUIPA, my research 
suggests that she overstates the case that RFRA has led to extreme religious liberty.  A regime of lawlessness can 
cut both for and against religious liberty. 
95 Howard Friedman’s excellent Religion Clause blog, http://religionclause.blogspot.com, lists thousands of such 
cases over the last 15 years or so. 
96 An amicus brief recently filed in the Supreme Court argues that the lower courts’ interpretations and 
applications of RLUIPA in prison cases have been riddled with inconsistency.  See Brief for Anti-Defamation League 
et al. , in Holt v. Hobbs, No, 13-6827, available here: http://www.becketfund.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/13-6827tsacAnti-DefamationLeague.pdf. 
97 See Lupu & Tuttle, note 2 supra, at 229-232; Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Forms and Limits of Religious 
Accommodation: The Case of RLUIPA, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1907, 1931-1935 (2011).  
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competence.98 So RLUIPA sometimes works, but does so at times by using an 
unconstitutional means of adjudication. 
RFRA in the Years After City of Boerne 
 Between the decision in City of Boerne in 1997, and the surprisingly 
religion-favorable decision in O Centro99 in 2006, RFRA remained persistently 
weak.  It applied to federal law only, and one principal controversy that arose was 
whether RFRA provided a defense in private civil actions, especially those brought 
under federal anti-discrimination law.100 My survey of RFRA decisions (federal 
prison cases excluded) from 1997 to 2006 was limited to cases in the federal 
courts of appeals. The record here is simple.  RFRA claimants NEVER prevailed.101  
98 This is the best explanation of the ministerial exception, broadly upheld in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & School v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), which rests on constitutional incompetence of the state to decide 
who is fit for ministry.  See Lupu & Tuttle, Secular Government, note ___ supra, at 43-61.  In Part III, I discuss this 
problem of ecclesiastical questions in the context of the Contraceptive Mandate Cases, where the question of 
attenuation between employer decisions about health insurance coverage and employee decisions about 
contraception has been litigated as part of the inquiry into whether the mandate “substantially burdens” religion. 
99 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
100 See Shruti Chaganti, Note, Why the [Federal] Religious Freedom Restoration Act Provides a Defense in Suits by 
Private Parties, 99 Va. L. Rev. 343 (2013).   Even when courts held that RFRA did apply in such actions, however, 
the Act never generated a good defense to anti-discrimination claims.  The ministerial exception did all of the 
defensive work in these cases. 
101 Decisions in favor of the government on the ground that the RFRA claimant had not demonstrated a 
“substantial burden” include: In re The Grand Jury Empaneling of Special Grand Jury, 171 F. 3d 826 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(no substantial burden in being compelled to testify against rabbi, who was father to the witnesses); Branch 
Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F. 3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (no substantial burden from restrictions on political 
campaigning by tax exempt church); Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F. 3d 1110 
(9th Cir. 2000) (copyright law imposes no substantial burden on church); Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F. 3d 12 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (obeying same speech restrictions as secular groups imposed no substantial burdens); Gary S. v. 
Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F. 3d 15 (1st Cir. 2004) (government's failure to provide to disabled children attending 
Catholic schools the same benefits as it provided to disabled public school children placed no burden on the 
plaintiffs’ exercise of religion). 
Decisions in favor of the government on the ground that the government has a compelling interest in 
imposing a burden on religious exercise include: Adams v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 170 F. 3d 173 (3d Cir. 
1999) (compelling interest in uniform tax policy); Browne v. United States, 176 F. 3d 25 (2d Cir. 1999) (same); 
Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Medical Ctr., 192 F. 3d 826 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Sandia, 188 F. 3d 1215 
(10th Cir. 1999) (compelling interest in protecting golden eagles); Gibson v. Babbit, 223 F. 3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(compelling interest in protecting bald and golden eagles); United States v. Indianapolis Baptist Temple, 224 F. 3d 
627 (7th Cir. 2000) (compelling interest in uniform application of tax policy); United States v. Oliver, 255 F. 3d 588 
(8th Cir. 2001) (compelling interest in preserving bald eagle population); Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F. 3d 1210 (9th Cir. 
2002) (compelling interest in enforcing Guam’s restrictions on importing marijuana); United States v. Hardman, 
297 F. 3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2002) (compelling interest in protecting bald eagles); Holy Land Foundation for Relief and 
Development v. Ashcroft, 333 F. 3d 156 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (compelling interest in blocking gift to designated terrorist 
organization); United States v. Antoine, 318 F. 3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003) (compelling interest in protecting bald and 
golden eagles): United States v. Brown, 330 F. 3d 1073 (8th Cir. 2003) (compelling interest in taking blood sample 
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However one explains this pattern, it indicates a persistent and gaping chasm 
between RFRA’s promise, as reflected in its stringent statutory formula, and 
RFRA’s performance. 
 Of course, a weak RFRA is not the same as a hopelessly inconsistent pattern 
of results under RFRA.  A RFRA could be construed in a consistently weak way, as 
has been the case under some state RFRA’s.102  To the point of the moment at 
which this essay is being prepared, a RFRA suddenly made strong by an 
authoritative Supreme Court interpretation might change the prevailing pattern, 
and produce consistently pro-religious freedom results. 
The Court’s decision in Gonzales v. O Centro103 advanced a surprisingly 
strong interpretation of RFRA, and suggested the possibility that RFRA’s original 
promise might actually be realized.  In O Centro, a unanimous Supreme Court 
affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction, blocking enforcement of the 
federal Controlled Substances Act against a religious group’s importation and use 
in its sacraments of hoasca tea, a hallucinogenic substance made from Brazilian 
plant material.  The government did not dispute that the ban on importation 
constituted a substantial burden on the religious exercise of members of the 
group.  Nevertheless, the government asserted that it had the requisite 
compelling interest(s), as required by RFRA, to impose this burden.   
First, the government argued that hoasca tea was dangerous to human 
health and that importation by the group presented a risk of diversion into illicit 
drug trafficking.  The district court put the government to its proof of these 
assertions.  The court concluded that the proof left the matter in equipoise,104 
and that the government therefore had failed to meet the burden of persuasion 
imposed by RFRA.  That conclusion may seem obvious from the language of RFRA 
taken alone, but religious liberty lawyers immediately recognized the dramatic 
potential of this emphasis on RFRA’s assignment to the government of the risk of 
non-persuasion.  
for DNA in criminal case); United States v. Israel, 317 F. 3d 768 (7th Cir. 2003) (compelling interest in prohibiting 
use of marijuana). 
102 See Part II.C., infra. 
103 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
104 Id. at 426. 
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Second, aside from any demonstrable dangers associated with allowing a 
RFRA exemption for sacramental use of hoasca tea, the government made a far 
more sweeping argument about the need for uniformity in administration of the 
Controlled Substances Act.  This line of argument, drawn from earlier cases about  
taxation,105 drew on the pre-Smith move of softening the compelling interest test 
by making it categorical, rather than asking whether the government had a 
compelling interest in denying an exemption in the particular case.  Drug cases, 
the government contended, could not be open to religious exemption claims, 
because of the intrinsic hazards of highly controlled substances, the high risk of 
insincere claims, and the slippery slope from one narcotic to the next.   
This sort of argument had always fared well in the “marijuana church” 
cases that appear from time to time in the lower federal courts,106 but the 
Supreme Court was surprisingly unimpressed by it.  Strenuously asserting that 
RFRA’s text demanded adjudication of the validity of a burden as applied to the 
particular person, the Court seized on the statutory exemption for peyote use in 
the sacraments of the Native American Church.  An interest cannot be compelling, 
the Court said, if other statutory exemptions permit “appreciable damage” to the 
same interest.107  Because hoasca tea and peyote present comparable risks, a 
statutory religious exemption for sacramental use of peyote undercut the 
argument that uniform treatment of such substances is essential.  Because most 
federal regulatory regimes include a variety of exceptions, at least some of which 
permit “appreciable damage” to regulatory concerns, the unanimous O Centro 
opinion appeared to offer a potent weapon to RFRA claimants. 
O Centro’s double move to strengthen RFRA – rigorous proof demands on 
the government’s arguments that exemptions threaten its compelling interests, 
and reliance on analogous statutory exceptions as evidence of weakness in those 
interests – should have led to spill-over effects in the lower courts.  But, true to 
the longstanding experience that judges are presumptively inclined against  
religious exemptions, the results have been quite to the contrary. 
105 Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). See also Goldman v. 
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (need for uniformity within the Armed Forces). 
106 There are a significant number of cases in which RFRA has been raised unsuccessfully as a defense to federal 
prosecutions for use, possession, or trafficking of marijuana.  See cases cited in note ___, supra (pre- O Centro), 
and note __, infra (post- O Centro). 
107 546 U.S. at 433. 
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In an exceptionally sophisticated student Note,108 published in 2009, 
Matthew Nicholson identified a striking tendency in the Courts of Appeals to 
retain the pre-O Centro status quo.  These included a tight limitation on what 
counts as a substantial burden under RFRA;109 continued reliance on pre-Smith 
free exercise decisions which adopted the categorical approach to compelling 
interests;110 deference to the government’s assertion that certain, narrowly 
framed interests are compelling;111 and a weak or deferential application of O 
Centro’s emphasis on statutory exemptions as evidence that government 
interests are less than compelling.112  As the Note demonstrates, O Centro quickly 
became an outlier rather than a stimulant to a new and tougher reading of RFRA.  
One might say that O Centro is to RFRA as Yoder was to Free Exercise law – sounds 
tough, plays weak. 
 My own inquiry into results in the lower federal courts since publication of 
that Note has confirmed both the inconsistency thesis and the weakness thesis 
that runs through this narrative.  Of the thirty or so non-prison cases decided on 
the RFRA merits, claimants prevailed in whole or part in only four.  One involved 
importation of Brazilian Daime tea, a substance very much like the hoasca tea in 
O Centro, used in the sacraments of the Brazilian Santo Daime religion.113 A 
second concerned the prohibition of beard-wearing by firefighters in the District 
of Columbia;114 the evidence did not support the District’s concern that facial hair 
108 Matthew Nicholson, Note, Is O Centro a Sign of Hope for RFRA Claimants?, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1281 (2009). 
109 95 Va. L. Rev. at 1301–1307, citing Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Service, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008) (e banc).  In 
Navajo Nation, the 9th Circuit followed the pre-Smith decision in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Ass’n to the effect that government conduct on its own land cannot inflict a legally cognizable burden on Native 
America worship sites on that land.  In the “Failure of RFRA,” note xx supra, I noted that narrow construction of the 
“substantial burden” term in RFRA was the most popular lower court strategy for limiting the statute’s force.  
110 95 Va. L. Rev. at 1307–1311, citing Jenkins v. Commissioner, 483 F. 3d 90 (2d Cir. 2007) (need for uniformity in 
tax cases survives O Centro); Olsen v. Mukasey, 541 F. 3d 827 (8th Cir. 2008) (need for uniformity in cases involving 
RFRA challenges to federal restrictions on use of marijuana). 
111 95 Va. L. Rev. at 1311–1319, citing Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (government has 
compelling interest in collecting DNA, despite a religious objection, from a person convicted of a non-violent 
felony). 
112 95 Va. L. Rev. 1319–1323, citing U.S. v. Adeyemo, 2008 WL 928546 (ND Cal April 4, 2008) (government interest 
in forbidding importation of leopard skins not fatally undercut by fact of other unregulated harms that threatened 
the species more); United States v. Friday, 525 F. 3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008) (government’s interest in prohibiting 
taking of eagles without a permit not fatally undercut by failure to do more to protect eagles against harm from 
electric power lines). 
113 Church of the Holy Light of the Queen v. Mukasey, 615 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Ore. 2009), vacated and remanded 
for narrower relief by 443 Fed. Appx. 302 (9th Cir. 2011). 
114 Potter v. District of Columbia, 558 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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interrupted the flow of air when the firefighter wore a face mask.  A third 
involved the treatment in bankruptcy of the Archdiocese of Milwaukee,115 and a 
fourth resulted in a remand of a claim that an IRS employee, a Sikh, had a RFRA-
based right to wear a ceremonial dagger at work, when existing practices 
appeared to permit exceptions from weapons restrictions in analogous cases in 
federal buildings.116 These four decisions appear to take O Centro quite seriously.  
The much larger number of losses, however, involved the historically 
common pattern in which the concepts of “substantial burden” and “compelling 
interest” were implemented in a government-favoring way.  In the former 
category are decisions involving claims that the government’s use of public lands 
renders them less suitable for worship;117 that religious speakers are entitled to 
access, better than that afforded to secular speakers, to public lands for 
distributing their message;118 and that the government motto, “In God We Trust” 
burdens any individual religious exercise.119 The compelling interest cases include 
the usual stock of unsuccessful RFRA defenses to charges for religiously motivated 
killing of bald eagles and the possession of eagle feathers,120 and to charges 
related to religiously motivated uses of marijuana.121 A smattering of other cases, 
also decided on compelling interest grounds, raised novel and unsuccessful claims 
– an asserted RFRA right to transfer funds to private groups in Iraq;122 and to 
refuse to stand when a federal court convened and recessed.123    
Of course, it is impossible to prove in the strong sense that this last run of 
post-O Centro decisions is internally inconsistent, or that the full body of RFRA 
115 In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 496 B.R. 905 (E.D. Wis. 2013). 
116 Tagore v. U.S., 735 F.3d 324 (5th Cir. 2013) (remanding for further consideration of evidence on RFRA claim). 
117 South Fork Band v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 643 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Nev. 2009); U.S. v. 2010 WL 2593966 (D 
ColoJune 23, 2010); Winnemen Wintu Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 725 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (E.D. Ca. 2010). 
118 Boardley v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 605 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 615 F. 3d 508 
(D.C. Cir. 2010); Mahoney v. Doe, 642 F. 3d 1112 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Dillard, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (D. 
Kan. 2012). 
119 Newdow v. Peterson, 2014 WL 2198552 (2d Cir. May 28, 2014); Newdow v. Lafeure, 598 f.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2010).  
See also Carmichael v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 5755618 (ED Va, 10/23/13) (objection to Social Security number as 
including the “mark of the beast” does not state a claim of substantial burden). 
120 U.S. v. Hardman, 638 F. 3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011) (consolidated with U.S. v. Wilgus); U.S. v. Aguilar, 527 Fed Appx. 
808 (10th Cir. 2013). 
121 Gover v. United States, No. 08–5207, 2009 WL 754692 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 19, 2009); United States v. Lafley, 656 F. 
3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011); U.S. v. Lepp, 446 Fed. Appx. 44 (9th Cir. 2011); U.S. v. Quaintance, 608 F. 3d 717 (10th Cir. 
2010); Multi-Denominational Ministry of Cannabis and Rastafa, Inc. v. Gonzales, 365 Fed. Appx. 817 (9th Cir. 2010). 
122 United States v. Islamic American Relief Agency, 2009 WL 4016478 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2009).  
123 U.S. v. Ali, 2012 WL 4128387 (D. Minn. Sept. 19, 2012). 
 29 
                                                          
case law (without regard to Boerne or O Centro as era markers) is internally 
inconsistent.  As with pre-Smith free exercise decisions, cases can always be 
distinguished on their facts.  But it is telling that the two recent victories include 
one on all fours with O Centro, and only two others, involving the wearing of 
masks by bearded firefighters and the wearing of ceremonial daggers into federal 
buildings, that closely followed O Centro by imposing on the government a 
rigorous burden of proof.  For most of the remainder, it was as if O Centro had 
changed little or nothing in judicial attitude or analysis.  As before, the record 
shows occasional outlier victories, and a stark pattern of defeats.   
As we all know, the contraceptive inclusion requirements under the 
Affordable Care Act have utterly changed the RFRA landscape.  In the last few 
years, the federal courts have decided far more contraceptive mandate cases 
under RFRA than all other non-prison RFRA cases combined.  Despite the long 
history of defeats for so many other RFRA claims, plaintiffs making such claims in 
contraceptive mandate cases have fared exceptionally well. Many of these involve 
for-profit companies like Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood Products; before the 
Supreme Court decided the Contraceptive Mandate Cases in late June, 2014, the 
Circuits were split, but for-profit firms won far more cases than they lost.124 More 
surprisingly, perhaps, challengers have also been quite successful at the 
preliminary relief stage in cases involving the Obama Administration’s 
accommodation of religiously affiliated non-profits, which can certify objection to 
coverage of contraceptives and thereby be excused from mandatory insurance 
coverage of such goods and services.125   
The data strongly suggest that both the analytic method and the victory 
rate in the contraceptive cases deviate sharply from the pattern in religious 
124 According to the Becket Fund’s well-maintained list of cases involving the contraceptive mandate, courts have 
resolved 41 cases involving for-profit firms, and the division runs sharply in favor of RFRA claimants – 35 
preliminary injunctions granted as compared to only 6 denied.   
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/#tab1.  The most prominent cases, are of course, the two that 
were the subject of the grant of certiorari – Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood Products. 
125 See id. (listing the cases brought by non-profits, and enumerating 24 preliminary injunctions granted, and only 2 
denied.) The most well-known cases in this category are Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 
134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014) (granting preliminary relief against enforcement of the mandate, as prescribed in the 
accommodating regulations governing religiously affiliated charities) and University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 
F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that the accommodation for religiously affiliated non-profits does not impose a 
substantial burden on the University) (Posner, J.); accord, Michigan Catholic Conference v. Burwell, No. 13-6640, 
2014 WL 2596753 (6th Cir,., June 2014). See also Wheaton College v. Burwell, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13a1284_ap6c.pdf. 
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exemption cases in prior times.  Throughout the contraceptive coverage litigation, 
many courts have been unusually receptive to claimants at the “substantial 
burden” stage, and quite hostile to the government at the “compelling interest” 
stage.  This can be explained in a variety of ways, discussed in Part III, but 
principled consistency over time with pre-Smith free exercise law, or with the 
patterns of pre-ACA RFRA law (even after O Centro) is not among them. In the for-
profit cases, the Lee dictum126 concerning “. . . followers of a particular sect 
enter[ing] into commercial activity . . .” who cannot “superimpose[]  . . . the limits 
they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith . . . on the 
statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity” – a proposition 
that had effectively deterred RFRA-based exemption claims by commercial actors 
for the past twenty years127 -- suddenly lost its potency.128 
C. State Constitutions and State RFRA’s 
 After Smith and City of Boerne, state law of religious liberty increased 
significantly in importance.  By variety and frequency, most religious liberty-
threatening encounters between citizens and their governments occur at the 
state and local level.  Smith weakened the First Amendment’s restrictions on state 
and local government; federal RFRA attempted to restore those restrictions, but 
City of Boerne soon thereafter constitutionally precluded application of federal 
RFRA to the states.  With respect to land use and institutionalized persons, 
RLUIPA filled this gap, but the great bulk of conflicts between religious liberty and 
state or local law remain the primary province of state and local law. 
In Smith’s immediate wake, a few state supreme courts construed their 
state constitutions to fill the gap created by Smith.129  The enactment of federal 
126 455 U.S. at 261. 
127 In addition to the Lee dictum, the Court’s unanimous opinion in Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Sec’y of 
Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) (religious Foundation is not substantially burdened by minimum wage requirements of 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act with respect to its employees working in commercial enterprises) has also 
discouraged religious exemption claims by commercial employers. 
128 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F. 3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc), aff’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13–354, 2014 WL 2921709 (U.S. June 30, 2014); Gilardi v. Dept. of Health and Human 
Services, 733 F. 3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated, No. 13-567, 2014 WL 2931834 (U.S. July 1, 2014); Tyndale House 
Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106 (D.D.C. 2012), appeal dismissed, No. 13–5018, 2013 WL 2395168 
(D.C. Cir. May 3, 2013). 
129 The earliest and best account of these developments can be found in Angela Carmella, State Constitutional 
Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275 (1993) (citing 
decisions by the Supreme Courts of Minnesota and Washington State).  recently suggested the possibility that it  
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RFRA dampened this surge, and nothing since has done much to reawaken it.130  
The story most relevant to this article’s thesis is that of state RFRA’s, which tend 
strongly to be modeled on federal RFRA – that is, they speak in Sherbert-Yoder 
terms of burdens on individual religious exercise and compelling state interests in 
imposing such burdens. 
Writing in 2010, Professor Christopher Lund canvassed the judicial results 
to that date of state RFRA’s.131  At that time, 16 states had RFRA’s; 10 of these 
were enacted in 1998-2000, in the immediate wake of City of Boerne.132 Professor 
Lund had hoped and expected that the strenuous language of state RFRA’s, 
coupled with the surprisingly strong construction and application of federal RFRA 
in O Centro, would produce a sturdy and growing body of religion-protective state 
statutory law.   He was quite disappointed by his findings in mid-2010.    Here is 
his summary: 
“. . . [F]our states have never decided even a single case under their state 
RFRA’s.  Six other states have decided only one or two cases apiece. . . . And when 
state RFRA claims have been brought, they rarely win.  In most jurisdictions, 
plaintiffs have not won a single state RFRA case litigated to judgment. . .  [S]ome 
states have seen significant state RFRA litigation and there have been some very 
important victories.  But in many states, state RFRA’s seem to exist almost 
entirely on the books.”133  Professor Lund’s bottom line was that, despite their 
strenuous language of protection for religious freedom, “[i]n most places, state 
RFRAs simply have not translated into a dependable source of protection for 
religious liberty at the state level.”134 
Professor Lund speculated that many lawyers were unaware of their state 
RFRA’s, and he cited complaints in lawsuits where state RFRA’s could have been 
relied upon but were not.135  He did not limit his criticism to the lawyering 
130 The California Supreme Court has more recently suggested that it will similarly construe the California 
Constitution in a pre-Smith, religion-protective way.  See [case about doctors refusing to provide reproductive 
services for same sex couple]. 
131 Christopher Lund, Religious Liberty after Gonzales [O Centro]: A Look at State RFRA’s, 55 South Dakota L. Rev. 
466 (2010). 
132 Since then, only Mississippi has been added to that list.  For discussion of the recent fight over the proposed 
Mississippi RFRA in Spring 2014, see Part I supra.  
133 Lund, note xx supra, at 467. 
134 Id. at 468. 
135 Id. at 481, note 92. 
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process, however.  He described a number of decisions in which state courts had 
dramatically weakened their state’s RFRA’s by construing them to require little or 
nothing more than a test of whether the challenged legal norm had a rational 
basis as applied to anyone – that is, as adding no force beyond the Smith-
weakened Free Exercise Clause itself.136   
At first glance, such a construction of a RFRA seems shocking to anyone 
who understands the flow of the law in this field – how can an enactment 
explicitly designed to restore the compelling interest test and thereby strengthen 
religious liberty be construed as entirely superfluous?  As this article has 
demonstrated, however, judges have always found ways to limit regimes of 
religious exemptions under general standards, whether they were Sherbert-Yoder 
standards in the Supreme Court’s decisions from the 1980’s, or federal RFRA 
standards both before and after City of Boerne.   State court judges, as Professor 
Lund appraised them in 2010, were just following this pattern with a vengeance. 
My own inquiry into the decisional law under state RFRAs since Professor 
Lund wrote shows a superficial appearance of uptick in success under state 
RFRAs.  Of twenty-two state RFRA cases decided on the merits, I found eight that 
might be characterized as victories, a far better record than in any prior period 
under state or federal RFRAs.  (Perhaps Professor Lund’s scholarly efforts had the 
desired effect.)  But the particulars of these decisions cast them in a somewhat 
narrower light.  Six of these eight came from two states.  Illinois produced three 
of them,137 all in the context of land use, and two of the three explicitly involved 
identical claims under federal RLUIPA.138  The Illinois statute added nothing of 
independent force.   
An additional three were decided under the Texas RFRA – one of those 
involved land use,139 a second concerned Santerian animal sacrifice,140 and a third 
136 Id. at 484-489 (citing decisions from Connecticut and Florida). 
137 World Outreach Conference Center v. City of Chicago, 591 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 2009); Our Savior Evangelical 
Lutheran Church v. Saville, 922 N.E. 2d 1143 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Irshad Learning Center v. County of DuPage, 937 F. 
Supp. 2d 910 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
138 World Outreach Conference Center v. City of Chicago, 591 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 2009); Irshad Learning Center v. 
County of DuPage, 937 F. Supp. 2d 910 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
139 Barr v. City of Sinton, 295 S.W. 3d 287 (Tex. 2009). 
140 Merced v. Kasson, 577 F. 3d 578 (5th Cir. 2009). For an insightful discussion of Merced, see James Oleske, 
Lukumi at Twenty:  Legacy of Uncertainty for Religious Liberty and Animal Welfare Laws, 19 Animal L. Rev. 295 
(2013). Professor Laycock, who successfully argued the Santerian animal sacrifice case (Church of the Lukumi 
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)) in the U.S. Supreme Court, was involved in Merced as well as in 
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involved public school grooming standards as applied to a Native America 
student.141 The Texas RFRA has been the most successful in producing a legally 
strengthened regime of religious freedom, although at least two of the three 
victories – the land use case, and the hair length case – might easily have come 
out the same way under RLUIPA and the 14th Amendment, respectively.142 So in 
the six cases from Illinois and Texas, the state RFRA probably made a dispositive 
difference in two at most. 
The fourteen losses in state RFRA cases involve, among other things, a mix 
of marijuana defenses,143 failed attempts to boost rights of religious speech to 
position of greater force than analogous secular speech,144 relationships between 
adults and children,145 and cases involving sexual abuse by clergy.146  Most, 
though not all, are “compelling interest” cases, where the government’s interests 
easily prevailed.  These results disclose no great surprises.  But the decisions since 
Professor Lund published in 2010 show that only in Texas have courts vigorously 
construed the statute.147  
Barr v. City of Sinton, 295 S.W. 3d 287 (Tex. 2009).  
141 A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F. 3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010). 
142  For an example of a successful pre-RFRA claim that school grooming standards violate the Constitution, see 
Alabama & Coushatta Tribes v. Big Sandy Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Texas 1993). 
143 State v. Hardesty, 214 P.3d 1004 (Ariz. 2009); State v. White, 152 P. 3d 1217 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011); State v. 
Cordingley, 302 P. 3d 730 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013). 
144 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 832 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D, Ariz. 2009), aff’d 707 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2013) (Arizona 
religious freedom statute); Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 586 F. 3d 263 (3d Cir. 2009) (Pennsylvania religious 
freedom statute); Phelps-Roper v. County of St. Charles, No. 4:10CV02232 AGF, 2013 WL 4458979 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 
20, 2013). 
145 Peace v. Peace, No. 1 CA-CV 13-0150, 2014 WL 1884868 (Ariz. Ct. App. May 8, 2014); State v. Bent, No. 29,227, 
2013 WL 4517161 (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2013), cert. denied 321 P. 3d 126 (N.M. 2013) (religious freedom statute 
is no defense to charges of unlawful sexual contact with minors by leader of spiritual group).   
146 Givens v. St. Adalbert Church, 56 Conn. L. Rptr. 585 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2013); Doe No. 2 v. Norwich Roman 
Catholic Diocesan Corp., 57 Conn. L. Rptr. 342 (Conn. Superior Ct. 2013). 
147 The state RFRA case most prominently discussed at the Symposium is one that produced no decision on its 
RFRA merits.  Elaine Photography v. Willock, 284 P. 3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d 309 P. 3d 53 (N.M. 2013), 
cert. denied, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/elane-photography-llc-v-willock, No. 13-585, April 7. 
2014. involved a New Mexico photographer who refused to provide services for the commitment ceremony of a 
lesbian couple, and was thereafter the target of a discrimination complaint in New Mexico Human Rights 
Commission.  In seeking review of the agency order against her, the photographer raised a defense under the New 
Mexico Religious Freedom Restoration Act.  The New Mexico Supreme the photographer’s federal constitutional 
defenses on the merits, and ruled that the state statute did not apply to litigation between private parties.   The 
question of applicability of RFRA, state and federal, has become judicially and legislatively important over the past 
several years.  See, e.g., Shruti Chaganti, Note, Why the [Federal] Religious Freedom Restoration Act Provides a 
Defense in Suits by Private Parties, 99 Va. L. Rev. 343 (2013).  I do not address the point in this article. 
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The Lessons of Religious Exemption Regimes 
 Looking back over fifty years of religious exemption regimes – the Free 
Exercise Clause under the purported reign of Sherbert-Yoder, federal RFRA, and 
state RFRAs – I find myself drawn to some stark conclusions.  First, the legal 
language of these regimes, in particular the demand for compelling interests to 
justify non-exemption of burdened religious exercise, is very strenuous.  Applied 
with the vigor of these concepts as utilized in the law of free speech and equal 
protection, one would expect exemption claims to succeed frequently.  But the 
evidence shows that they don’t.  The Supreme Court made it a steady practice to 
honor in the breach the free exercise principles nominally stated in Sherbert-
Yoder.  The lower federal courts have implemented federal RFRA very weakly, 
even after the prod from O Centro, and the state courts have tended to do 
likewise with state RFRAs.  For fifty years, judges at all levels have looked for ways 
to avoid privileging religiously motivated behavior over its secular counterparts.  
To be sure, under all these regimes, occasional victories appear, even prior to the 
extraordinary run of victories in the contraceptive mandate cases.  The record 
shows that these earlier victories tended to reflect the kind of hybrid rights claims 
discussed in Smith,148 or – in rare instances – cases in which state interests seem 
extremely weak and the countervailing religious interests seem unusually 
strong.149  Taken separately, some of these victories appear manifestly just and 
appropriate.  In most of these cases, however, judges seem ever mindful of the 
slippery slope of religious exemptions.  As I wrote in 1989, “"Behind every free 
exercise claim is a spectral march; grant this one, a voice whispers to each judge, 
and you will be confronted with an endless chain of exemption demands from 
religious deviants of every stripe.”150 Despite the Court’s sneering reference in O 
148 See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic University of America, EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(hybrid of free exercise and establishment clause supports ministerial exemption from prohibition on sex 
discrimination in employment); Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, 165 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(hybrid of Free Exercise Clause rights and Takings Clause rights), vacated on ripeness grounds on rehearing en 
banc, 220 F.3d 1134 (2000). 
149 Cases involving attempts under local zoning laws to shut down church-sponsored programs to feed the 
homeless are perhaps a good example of this.  See, e.g., Western Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning 
Adjustments, 862 F. Supp. 538 (D.D.C. 1994). Of course, that assessment is mine; others would weigh interests in 
this and other cases far differently.  That’s the nub of the problem of religious exemptions. 
150 Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 933, 
947  (1989). 
 35 
                                                          
Centro to this apprehension,151 its decision produced very little change in judicial 
behavior prior to the Contraceptive Mandate Cases. 
One promising explanation of this pattern in both the Free Exercise Clause 
decisions between 1963 and 1990, and the RFRA decisions of the past twenty 
years, is the enormous range of legal norms that may fall prey to religious 
exemption claims.  The overwhelming majority of speech and press claims attach 
to laws that regulate the content or process of communications.152  In contrast, 
religious exemption claims may sweep in a range of religious beliefs and practices 
as wide and deep as the human condition itself, and a correspondingly enormous 
range of government interests.  The Supreme Court has seen very few such claims 
in the past 20 years, but the lower courts see them quite regularly, in cases from 
within and without institutions of confinement.  It is hardly a wonder that judges 
in those lower courts, backed by the Supreme Court’s own retreat in Free Exercise 
decisions during the 1980’s, proceed with great caution and persistent deference 
to government, despite RFRA’s bold, religion-protective language.  Those judges 
just don’t know what is coming next, and they lack the discretionary jurisdiction 
that enables the Supreme Court to decide these cases only on very rare occasion. 
Writing in 1999, Professor Eugene Volokh commended the statutory 
approach to religious exemptions, as distinguished from the constitutional 
approach, on the ground that the statutory approach preserved democratic 
accountability and control by permitting legislative overrides of particular judicial 
decisions.153  As Professor Volokh pointed out, legislatures are not free to similarly 
override rights-recognizing decisions, like Yoder, that root exemptions in 
constitutional norms. 
151 “ . . . the Government's argument for uniformity is different; it rests not so much on the particular statutory 
program at issue as on slippery-slope concerns that could be invoked in response to any RFRA claim for an 
exception to a generally applicable law. The Government's argument echoes the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats 
throughout history: If I make an exception for you, I'll have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions. But RFRA 
operates by mandating consideration, under the compelling interest test, of exceptions to "rule[s] of general 
applicability." 546 U.S. at 436.  
152  Speech claims designed to create exceptions to norms outside the direct regulation of communications are 
notoriously unsuccessful.  See, e.g., U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (First Amendment is no defense to critic of 
military conscription who willfully destroyed his Selective Service certificate as a symbolic protest during Vietnam 
War).  For my own, quite personal take on O’Brien, see Ira C. Lupu, Teaching United v. O’Brien:  Three 
Conversations and the wisdom of John Hart Ely, 16 Green Bag 2d 291 (2013). 
153 Eugene Volokh, A Common Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1465 (1999). 
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This view made perfect sense as a matter of academic logic.  Let judges 
make case by case decisions under general statutory norms, in light of the facts 
and the precedents, and permit legislatures to correct “mistakes.”  In practice, 
however, things have not worked out quite this way.  The only Congressional 
overrides in such cases have been of judicial denials of constitutional claims – with 
respect to the wearing of religious garb while in the armed forces,154 and with 
respect to exemption from FICA contributions by business firms owned by Old 
Order Amish.155  Congress has never overridden a federal RFRA decision, and no 
one expects that pattern to change in response to the Contraceptive Mandate 
Cases.156  
In the states, the results are nearly identical.  My research has disclosed no 
cases in which a state legislature has overridden a state judicial decision in favor 
of or against a state RFRA claim.157 Professor Lund’s work, cited above, identified 
two instances in which state legislatures amended RFRAs to include a new 
coverage restriction.158  One involved permitting Illinois to relocate cemeteries 
and graves in light of the modernization of Chicago’s O’Hare Airport,159 and the 
other involved a Florida statute that, while RFRA litigation on the matter was 
pending, excluded from the state’s RFRA the statutory requirement for a full-face 
photograph on a driver’s license.160  It is not hard to spot a post 9/11 anti-Muslim 
154  Congress responded to the decision in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986), which rejected a free 
exercise claim to wear a yarmulke (skull-cap) by an Orthodox Jewish Captain while on duty in the Air Force, by 
enacting 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2006), which specifies norms and processes for religious accommodations with respect to 
requirements of wearing certain apparel in the Armed Forces. 
155  Congress responded to the decision in U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982(, which rejected a free exercise claim by 
an Old Order Amish employer to be exempted from FICA contributions on behalf of his Old Order Amish 
employees, by creating a statutory exemption.  See 26 U.S.C. sec. 3127 (a)(2), (b)(1). 
156 Senators Reid, Murray, Boxer and others have sponsored legislation to overturn the result in Hobby Lobby, but 
no one believes it can be enacted in this Congress.  See Robert Pear, Democrats Push Bill to Reverse Supreme 
Court Ruling on Contraception, N.Y. Times, July 8, 2014, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/us/politics/democrats-draft-bill-to-override-contraception-ruling.html.  
Enactments designed to take away particular judicial victories for religious freedom raise their own constitutional 
problems.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)). See generally Ira C. Lupu, 
The Case Against Legislative Codification of Religious Liberty, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 565 (1999). 
157 I inquired of Professor Volokh in June, 2014, whether he was aware of any such overrides, and his answer was 
no.  E-mail Volokh to Lupu, on file with author and HJLG. 
158 Lund, note __ supra, at 493-496. 
159 Id. at 493-495.  The Seventh Circuit upheld the provision against constitutional attack in St. John’s United 
Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2007). 
160 Lund, supra note __ supra, at 495-496.  The statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. Sec. 322.142 (1) (West 2010), was 
designed to pre-empt the state RFRA claim in Freeman v. Dept. of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 924 So. 2d 
48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).  I inquired of Professor Lund in June, 2014, whether he was aware of any additional 
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bias in cases like the one from Florida.161  Aside from momentary fits of that kind, 
the legislative experience of the past two decades is that RFRA-enacting 
legislatures are content to delegate in general terms, take credit for protecting 
“religious freedom,” and leave all the hard choices to the judiciary.  As this Part 
has demonstrated, the state and federal judiciary has been less than eager to 
exercise that discretion in favor of religious liberty.  
The enduring qualities of religious exemption regimes – constitutional and 
statutory, federal or state – are weakness, plasticity, erratic and unpredictable 
bursts of religion-protective energy, and the consequent tendency to produce 
deep inconsistencies. The Supreme Court’s disposition of Hobby Lobby, and the 
profound disagreements among the Justices on the wide range of questions 
presented by the case, powerfully reinforces this appraisal.  
 
 
III. The Contraceptive Mandate Cases  
As expected, the Court’s decision (per Justice Alito) in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc.162 (hereafter “Hobby Lobby”) sent shock waves across the legal and 
political culture. The division among the Justices took the distressingly predictable 
form of 5-4, with all the Republican appointees on one side and all the 
Democratic appointees on the other.  Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote a brief and 
vital concurring opinion163 that suggests the route forward, discussed below 
Recall the operative four questions in Hobby Lobby, and the logical linkage 
among them.  First, is a for-profit corporation a “person” who can “exercise 
religion” within the meaning of RFRA?164 If so, does the mandate to include all 
forms of pregnancy prevention services in health insurance “substantially burden” 
the firm’s religious exercise? (If not, government wins.)  If so, is application of that 
episodes of such legislative restrictions on coverage in response to particular litigation or other events, and his 
answer was no.  E-mail Lund to Lupu, on file with author and HJLG. 
161 See generally Michael Heise & Gregory Sisk, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence 
From the Federal Courts, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 231 (2012).  
162 573 U.S. ___ (2014); 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4505 (U.S., No.  13-354, June 30,2014). 
163 Id. at ___. 
164 The opinion does not address whether shareholders of a corporation, closely held or otherwise, are burdened 
within the meaning of RFRA by obligations imposed by the corporation.  This article will similarly not address the 
question. 
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burden to the firm “in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest”?  (If 
not, government loses.)  If so, is the requirement of such coverage in the 
employer-purchased health coverage “the least restrictive means of furthering 
that compelling governmental interest”? (If not, government loses. If so, 
government wins.) 
 Hobby Lobby prevailed because it won on questions 1 (person), 2 
(substantial burden), and 4 (not the least restrictive means).  As explained below, 
however, the disposition of question 3 – compelling interest – proved to be both 
the most subtle and surprising. 
Before sub-dividing analysis along the lines marked out by of each of these 
four issues, I want to flag two meta-questions that hover over Hobby Lobby, and 
that I will address within each of the following issue-oriented sections.  The first is 
a broad methodological problem of statutory interpretation, identified crisply at 
oral argument165 and addressed sharply in both the Court opinion and Justice 
Ginsburg’s principal dissent.   What, precisely, did Congress restore when it 
enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act?166  Legislative history strongly 
suggested that Congress was reacting to Smith, and not to the long run of 
decisions, such as Bob Jones University, U.S. v. Lee, and Lyng, that had qualified 
and weakened the Sherbert-Yoder regime.  The government thus argued that 
RFRA incorporated by reference the pre-Smith free exercise decisions, or at least 
the decisions that dealt explicitly and directly with the concepts of “substantial 
burdens” and “compelling interests.” In particular, the government had relied 
heavily on the Lee dictum about acceptance by business entrants of applicable 
regulatory regimes.  Following this line of argument exactly, Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent argued that RFRA had essentially codified the Lee dictum, and that Hobby 
Lobby’s claims accordingly should fail.167   
In Justice Alito’s view, however, the language of the statute controlled the 
case.  And that language never points back to any particular result, much less any 
165 See TAN __, supra. 
166 For contemporaneous elaboration of this point, see Martin Lederman, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/07/hobby-lobby-part-xviii-one-potentially.html, flagging my 1995 article that 
identified this as a core question going forward.  Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 171 (1995) (asking whether a statute written in such 
strenuous terms would eventually break free from its earlier case law moorings).   
167 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. __, __ (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (slip op. at 31-32). 
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dictum, in pre-Smith cases.  The text of RFRA never says that Sherbert or Yoder (or 
any other case) was rightly or wrongly decided.  RFRA’S formally declared 
purposes include restoration of a legal standard “as set forth” (NOT as applied) in 
Sherbert and Yoder.168 That language represented a codification of a standard of 
review, not a set of judicial opinions.  As Alito puts it, “nothing in the text of RFRA 
. . . suggested that the statutory phrase ‘exercise of religion under the First 
Amendment’ was meant to be tied to this Court’s pre-Smith interpretation of that 
Amendment.”169 
What renders this dispute about interpretive methodology unusual is that 
virtually all of the relevant terms – exercise of religion, substantial burden, 
compelling interest, and least restrictive means – are not of Congressional 
creation.  The first comes from the Constitution itself, and the Court had glossed it 
in a variety of ways.  The second, third, and fourth come directly from judicial 
opinions applying the Free Exercise Clause to particular claims.  When Congress 
asserts restorative purposes, and chooses judicial terms of art in the restorative 
enterprise, is it not reasonable for the Court to treat those terms as importing 
their pre-existing judicial gloss?170  If Congress wanted a new approach, why did it 
legislate in terms associated with the prior regime? 
The second meta-question looming above the Hobby Lobby opinions is the 
one to which this entire article is addressed – can judges be reasonably consistent 
over time, and across widely different fact patterns, in applying concepts like 
substantial burden, compelling interest, and least restrictive alternative?  As the 
analysis below reveals, each side of the Court (majority and principal dissent) may 
have dealt with each of the four issues in an internally coherent way.  There is 
room for deep doubt, however, as to whether either side’s approach is fully 
consistent with past decisions under RFRA or the Free Exercise Clause, pre-Smith.  
More troubling by far, the relevant questions are sufficiently vague that any and 
all answers to them are equally persuasive; that is, they do not cabin judgment in 
ways consistent with a rule of law. 
168 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000bb-(b). 
169 Hobby Lobby, slip op. at 35. 
170 I originally focused on these questions at the time Congress was considering RFRA.  Ira C. Lupu, Statutes 
Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1, 56-62 (1993).  
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I think my readers will be guided most fairly through the four sub-sections 
that follow if they know my own judgments about the Hobby Lobby litigation.  As 
Professor Tuttle and I posted in February of 2014,171 the government should have 
prevailed. But we disagreed with the government’s position on corporate 
religious exercise, and on whether Hobby Lobby’s exercise of religion was 
substantial burdened by the contraceptive mandate.  We believed then, and still 
believe, that the Establishment Clause requires a construction of RFRA that does 
not permit the imposition of significant harms on third parties – in this case, 
female employees and female dependents of all employees.  Loss of no-cost 
coverage of pregnancy prevention services, even for an interim period, is such a 
harm.  Speaking for myself, I think that the government satisfied the compelling 
interest test, and that the alternative means for providing such coverage are 
inadequate because of a combination of political, administrative, fiscal, and legal 
uncertainties.  But I do not for a minute believe that the prior law compelled that 
result and no other. 
Here is my analytic breakdown of the four main issues: 
A. Corporate religious exercise.   
The question whether for-profit corporations could be persons that 
exercise religion received tremendous attention in the Hobby Lobby litigation.  
Attached to this question was the related one of whether shareholders (who were 
quite obviously persons) in closely held companies were the relevant, burdened 
parties.  The government had argued consistently that corporations were not 
persons, and that the shareholder-persons were not obligated to do anything by 
the ACA, and so were not burdened. 
It was inevitable that the ghost of Citizens United v. FEC172 would haunt this 
corporate personhood question.  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en 
banc in Hobby Lobby, treated Citizens United as a relevant authority.173  Not so 
the Supreme Court majority, which found an easy route to the answer.  The 
federal Dictionary Act, which defines terms for purposes of the U.S. Code “unless 
the context indicates otherwise,” states that the word “person . . . includes 
171  Lupu & Tuttle, Religious Questions and Saving Constructions, available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/symposium-religious-questions-and-saving-constructions. 
172 558 U.S. ___ (2010). 
173 723 F. 3d 1114, 1133 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
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corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies . . . as well as 
individuals.”174  Does the context of RFRA, and “religious exercise,” indicate 
otherwise? 
The most grievous flaw in the government’s argument to exclude for-profit 
corporations from RFRA’s coverage is that the overwhelming majority of religious 
institutions are held in the corporate form.  Individual human beings, who live and 
die, do not own houses of worship, religious colleges and universities, religious 
charities, or religiously affiliated health care institutions.  These entities are held 
in perpetuity in corporate form, in the name of faith communities.  It could not 
possibly be disputed that these entities exercised religion, and many of the 
Court’s prior decisions had of course recognized that.175   
What distinguishes Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. from such institutions?176  
First, by definition, Hobby Lobby has a profit motive, and earnings that inure to 
the benefit of its owners.  That motive disqualifies it from non-profit status, which 
has considerable legal significance, in tax law or otherwise.  But the state has no 
constitutional warrant for excluding profit-makers from the ranks of entities with 
religious purposes; that is a theological move, not open to the state.  Second, 
Hobby Lobby’s primary commercial purpose is selling products to hobbyists.  But 
religious colleges have primary educational purposes, and religious hospitals have 
primary purposes of healing the sick, and these purposes do not disqualify any 
entity from the status of persons exercising religion. 
The government, perhaps recognizing this weakness in its conceptual 
argument, fell back on prior law.  Never, the government asserted, had the 
Supreme Court ruled that a business corporation could exercise religion under the 
First Amendment or RFRA.  But the Court had never ruled otherwise, either, even 
in cases where it might have done so,177 and it had adjudicated free exercise 
claims by individual business entrepreneurs.178  So the question was entirely 
174 1 U.S.C. sec. 1. 
175 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Gonzales v. O Centro , 546 U.S. 418 
(2006).  The cases about disposition of church property, see, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), are different; 
they rest on the constitutional requirement of judicial abstention from ecclesiastical issues.  Lupu & Tuttle, note 2 
supra, at 61-69. 
176 The best overall work on this subject is Mark Rienzi, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Money-
Makers, 21 George Mason L. Rev. 59 (2013).  
177 Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Supermarket of Mass., Inc. 366 U.S. 61 (1961). 
178 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
 42 
                                                          
open.  Even if RFRA restored pre-Smith law in its entirety, nothing in that body of 
law firmly foreclosed a judgment that for-profit corporations might exercise 
religion.179  
Of the four Hobby Lobby questions, only the issue of corporate religious 
personhood had an answer strenuously rooted in legal authority, widespread 
practice, and legal logic. It was no surprise to me, though barely mentioned in the 
media coverage of the case, that the Court divided 5-2 on this question.  Justices 
Kagan and Breyer did not join the portions of the dissent that concluded that for-
profit corporations could not be persons that exercise religion.180  They perhaps 
did not want to undercut Justice Ginsburg’s dissent by openly disagreeing about 
anything, but they seemed to recognize that the question in the case was not 
whether Hobby Lobby had RFRA rights; rather, the question was what RFRA rights 
Hobby Lobby had.  
B. “Substantially Burden.” 
The concept of “substantial burdens” is the trigger for RFRA’s seemingly 
stringent protection.   If the claimant cannot make this showing, the tests of 
compelling interest and least restrictive means do not kick in.  As Professor Tuttle 
and I have emphasized,181 the test of substantial burden has two parts, not just 
one.  Here is our formulation in February 2014 in a SCOTUS blog post:182 
“As Sherbert and Yoder perfectly illustrate, a burden on religion involves conflict 
between a person’s legal interests and her religious practices.  What is rarely 
noticed, however, is that the collision of interests must meet two measures of 
substantiality, not just one.  The conflict must involve, as in Sherbert, the 
imposition of substantial secular costs on the religiously compliant person.  Less 
179 The fact that Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood Products were closely held, family-run businesses made the 
argument easier, but there is nothing in the logic of the Hobby Lobby majority that restricts religious exercise to 
such companies.  Publicly traded, widely held companies might develop a religious identity, but the impracticality 
of obtaining internal agreement on the Board of Directors, or among shareholders, as to what that identity is, 
makes such assertions of corporate religious personhood extremely unlikely.  
180 2014 U.S. LEXIS at ___ (Breyer and Kagan, JJ., dissenting) ((agreeing with Justice Ginsburg that Hobby Lobby 
should lose on the merits, but asserting the non-necessity of deciding the corporate personhood question and 
therefore not joining that portion of the Ginsburg dissent.) 
181 Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 198-199. 
182 Lupu & Tuttle, Religious Questions and Saving Constructions, available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/02/symposium-religious-questions-and-saving-constructions. See also, Lupu & 
Tuttle, note 2 supra, at 197-199. 
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well noticed, the conflict also must involve substantial religious costs for those 
who comply with secular law. “ 
 Unpacking the dual inquiries into substantiality of a burden sheds 
considerable light on both the Alito opinion and the Ginsburg dissent in Hobby 
Lobby.  With respect to the secular costs of compliance with faith, Alito 
emphasizes the huge fines that Hobby Lobby would incur if it offered a 
nonconforming insurance policy to its employees.183 On this point, the Ginsburg 
dissent offers no challenge. 
The nub of disagreement between majority and dissent attaches to the 
other, less frequently noticed half of the inquiry into “substantial burdens” – their 
religious substantiality.  The government had argued, and Justice Ginsburg 
agreed,j184 that the religious objections to contraceptive coverage were legally 
insubstantial because they were too attenuated – that is, removed from the 
choice to use the contraceptives in question.  The government was compelling the 
owners of the companies to include coverage of the contested items in an 
insurance policy, and the employees independently would decide whether or not 
to use IUD’s or emergency contraception.  The majority, per Justice Alito, 
repudiated any analytic effort to measure the distance between the purchase of 
insurance and the choice of pregnancy prevention service.  Justice Alito insisted 
that courts have no business addressing whether a set of religious convictions – in 
this case, that purchasing the objected-to coverage constitutes material 
cooperation with or facilitation of sin – are reasonable.185 Despite Justice Alito’s 
insistence elsewhere that RFRA did not absorb the entirety of the pre-Smith gloss 
on the Free Exercise Clause,186 here he relies heavily on Thomas v. Review 
Board,187 in which the Court had refused to adjudicate an apparent dispute 
183 Justice Alito acknowledges that Hobby Lobby had a choice to drop health insurance and make, under the 
Internal Revenue Code, an assessable payment of $2000 per year per full-time employee. Slip op. at 32-33. For 
whatever reason, the government had never asserted that this option made the secular pressure on employers 
insubstantial. Alito concludes that the question of whether this option renders the burden insubstantial is an 
empirical one, turning on the operation of labor markets.  In any event, the majority asserts that the argument in 
unpersuasive, because the owners of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood Specialties have religious motivation for 
offering health insurance to employees.  Slip op. at 33-34. They don’t want to drop the coverage, and the payment 
of $2000 per employee just adds to the pressure to maintain coverage that includes the objectionable goods. 
184 Hobby Lobby, Ginsburg dissent, slip op. at 21-23. 
185 Hobby Lobby, slip op. at 36. 
186 Id. at 48, note 43 (rejecting the Lee dictum as controlling in a RFRA case). 
187 Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981), cited in Hobby Lobby, slip op. at 37.  Justice Alito also cites Emp. 
Div. v. Smith for the same point, see id., without acknowledging that Smith relied on the point as a reason to 
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between the claimant and another member of his faith with respect to Biblical 
interpretation and the wrongdoing of producing armaments or their 
components.188 
Justice Ginsburg did not argue (perhaps because the government had failed 
to point out) that Wisconsin v. Yoder,189 the lynchpin exemption case and explicit 
model for RFRA’s operative standards, teaches somewhat to the contrary with 
respect to the judicial role in evaluating the substantiality of religious burdens.  
The Yoder opinion is thick with recitation of the evidence of impact of compulsory 
education on adolescents and the consequences for the survival of the Amish 
community.190  To be sure, Yoder did not involve disputed questions of scripture, 
like Thomas, but neither did Hobby Lobby. 
The Congress that enacted RFRA gave no thought to which burdens are 
substantial, or to the adjudicative methods that courts might use to decide that 
question.  If the relevant inquiry in Hobby Lobby is ecclesiastical, pertaining to 
matters of faith alone and resolvable only by intra-faith exegesis and controversy, 
perhaps Alito is right.  If, on the other hand, the relevant inquiry involves the 
degree of involvement of an insurance policy purchaser in the conduct of the 
insured employees, the question begins to look more like one of accomplice 
liability in criminal law191 and less like a matter of Bible study.  And if RFRA sets 
the courts free from pre-Smith law, the issue of inquiry into substantiality is an 
entirely open question, bound down with no precedential encrustation 
whatsoever. 
It is not my purpose here to resolve the methodological or substantive 
questions involved in application of the “substantial burden” trigger within RFRA.  
My point is more simple and direct – all paths were open to the Justices.  The 
majority preferred the Thomas rule of judicial abstention; the dissent preferred 
active judicial involvement in the question of the religious substantiality of the 
discontinue religious exemptions, not as a doctrinal move in adjudicating when government must provide such 
exemptions. 
188 450 U.S. at 715-716 (courts are constitutionally incompetent arbiters of competing scriptural interpretation). 
189 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
190 Id. at 216-218. 
191 Eugene Volokh, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Complicity in Sin, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 30, 
2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/30/the-religious-freedom-
restoration-act-and-complicity-in-sin/. 
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burden. Each took the course he or she wanted, and ignored the others.  When all 
paths are equally open, no one is constrained. 
C. Compelling government interest (or, The Dog That Didn’t Bark)192 
The Court, having found RFRA’s “substantial burden” requirement satisfied, 
was then obliged to consider RFRA’s “exception” -- the statutory provision that 
imposes two, independent requirements on the government.  The initial 
requirement is that the government “demonstrate[] that application of the 
burden to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest.”  
If the government fails to so demonstrate, the case is over; the government loses, 
and may not impose the burden on the complaining person.  No inquiry into 
“least restrictive means” is necessary in such a case. 
The government had argued that a variety of very strong policy arguments 
supported the mandate of no-cost coverage of contraceptives of all kinds.  These 
included women’s reproductive health, gender equality in health costs, increased 
avoidance of unwanted pregnancies, and the need for at least some contraceptive 
medicines as treatment for other conditions.193  And, at the margin – that is, on 
the question of a compelling interest in applying the burden to each relevant 
person or firm – the need to provide every woman with the relevant coverage 
seemed evident.  An exemption for Hobby Lobby would have eliminated that 
coverage for thousands of female employees and female beneficiaries of all 
employees.  Moreover, a prominent amicus brief had asserted that a RFRA 
exemption for Hobby Lobby would violate the Establishment Clause by imposing 
the costs of the owners’ faith on the women deprived of coverage.194 
Nevertheless, a number of other circuit courts had earlier concluded that 
the government had not satisfied the compelling interest test.195  These lower 
courts had repeatedly looked to the Supreme Court’s relatively recent and 
192 See Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze (in which Holmes explains “the curious incident of the dog in the night-
time;” the dog’s silence at the approach of a person at night revealed that the person was someone familiar to the 
dog). 
193 Brief for Petitioner at 46-48, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13–354, 2014 WL 2921709 (U.S. June 30, 
2014) (No. 13–354), 2014 WL 173486 
194 Brief for Church-State Scholars Frederick Mark Gedicks et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13–354, 2014 WL 2921709 (U.S. June 30, 2014) (No. 13–354), 2014 WL 333891. 
195 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F. 3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc), aff’d sub nom., Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13–354, 2014 WL 2921709 (U.S. June 30, 2014); Gilardi v. Dept. of Health and Human 
Services, 733 F. 3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated and remanded, No. 13-567, 2014 WL 2931834 (U.S. July 1, 2014). 
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unanimous decision in Gonzales v. O Centro, and had noticed the Court’s 
treatment there of the exemption for peyote use by Native Americans.  Here is 
what the Court wrote in O Centro:196 
“the Executive and Congress itself have decreed an exception from the Controlled 
Substances Act for Native American religious use of peyote. If such use is 
permitted in the face of the congressional findings . . . for hundreds of thousands 
of Native Americans practicing their faith, it is difficult to see how those same 
findings alone can preclude any consideration of a similar exception for the 130 or 
so American members of the UDV who want to practice theirs.” 
 In other words, the Act’s exception for some religious uses of peyote 
weakened considerably the government’s argument that it had a compelling 
interest in not making exceptions for religious uses of comparable substances.197  
In the contraceptive mandate litigation, the most relevant exception to the 
mandate was the exception for “grandfathered plans,” which employers had 
selected pre-ACA and wished to maintain.  A number of circuit courts had 
pounced on this, along with other exceptions to the ACA, and concluded that the 
government had failed in its compelling interest argument.198 
With that background in mind, consider the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
the “compelling interest” question.  Justice Alito writes that “it is arguable that 
there are features of ACA that support”199 the view that the government’s 
interest is not compelling, and references the grandfathering exception 
immediately thereafter.200 With O Centro the most recent and only Supreme 
196 546 U.S. at 433.   
197 The Court in O Centro followed its reference to the peyote exemption with this:  “See Church of Lukumi Babalu 
Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) ("It is established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence that `a law 
cannot be regarded as protecting an interest `of the highest order' ... when it leaves appreciable damage to that 
supposedly vital interest unprohibited'" (quoting Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524, 541-542 (1989) (SCALIA, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment))). 
198 Gilardi v. Dep’t. of Health and Human Services, 733 F. 3d 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2013), vacated, No. 13-567, 2014 WL 
2931834 (U.S. July 1, 2014); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F. 3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom., 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13–354, 2014 WL 2921709 (U.S. June 30, 2014); Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F. 
3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013). 
199 Hobby Lobby, slip op. at 39. 
200 Id. at 40.  Justice Alito also references the ACA exemption for employers with fewer than 50 full-time 
employees, but this is inapposite, because any health insurance those employees obtain, either through 
employment or on exchanges, will include full contraceptive coverage. 
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Court RFRA precedent, one would have expected the Court in Hobby Lobby to 
apply the O Centro analysis of under-inclusion at this point.   
There are, of course, some good responses to that argument as applied in 
Hobby Lobby.  First, the grandfathering exception to ACA is essentially a transition 
rule; the peyote exception is permanent.  The peyote exception is tethered to a 
particular faith with many members, so it was very hard to explain why the 
government could not consider a RFRA exception with respect to a comparable 
substance, for a very small religious community.  And the government was 
insisting in O Centro on the need for uniformity in application of the Controlled 
Substance Act, akin to claimed need for uniformity in enforcement of tax law.201 
The government made no comparable claim in Hobby Lobby; HHS could live with 
some exceptions, especially if the biggest one declined quickly over time.  
Despite all of these important lines of argument about compelling interests 
and the relevance of O Centro, neither the majority, dissent, or concurrence 
engages directly with this line of argument from cites O Centro. Instead, having 
sympathetically introduced the themes of this argument, Justice Alito abruptly 
announces that the Court:202 
 “find[s] it unnecessary to adjudicate this issue.  We will assume that the 
[asserted] interest . . . is compelling . . ., and proceed to consider the final prong 
of the RFRA test . . . whether HHS has shown that the contraceptive mandate is 
“the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”  
This is the mystery of Hobby Lobby.  The opinion sounds no bark from the O 
Centro dog of exceptions to coverage as representing a weakness in any argument 
that an interest is compelling.  No Justice directly mentions O Centro in this 
connection, despite the facts that O Centro was a unanimous opinion, written by 
Chief Justice Roberts, and joined by Justice Alito in his first full Term on the Court. 
Of course, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion puts the mystery to rest.  
He asserts unequivocally that “it is important to confirm that a premise of the 
Court’s opinion is its assumption that the [challenged] HHS regulation . . . furthers 
201 If RFRA is cut loose entirely from Lee and free exercise norms, tax cases too should be adjudicated case by case, 
not categorically. 
202 Hobby Lobby, slip op. at 40. 
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a legitimate and compelling interest in the health of female employees.”203 What 
is evident from that confirmation, and the discussion of alternatives that follows, 
is that the price of Justice Kennedy’s fifth vote for the Court’s opinion was non-
adjudication of – not agreement upon -- the question of compelling interest.  Had 
Justices Alito, Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts followed the lead of the 
many lower courts that had found the government’s interest uncompelling, they 
would have stopped their analysis at that point; the government would have lost, 
and the availability of alternatives would have become legally irrelevant.  There is 
every indication from their abstention on the question that such a move would 
have made their opinion a plurality only, and that Justice Kennedy’s separate 
opinion would then have controlled the outcome of the case.204 
There is nothing sinister or professionally inappropriate about the sort of 
compromise that would lead four Justices to assume an answer to a question – 
one they might well have answered differently on their own – in order to hold a 
majority.  In the RFRA context, however, there is something quite troubling about 
concluding that the government has substantially violated a person’s religious 
freedom, and then refusing to confront the question of whether the 
government’s interest is strong enough to justify the burden.  Other cases in the 
RFRA pipeline, on contraceptive coverage and otherwise, might have been 
significantly influenced by a four-Justice plurality opinion on the merits of Hobby 
Lobby’s non-trivial argument that exceptions to the mandate left “appreciable 
damage” to the government’s interest unremedied.   
For this dog to have remained quiet is thus profoundly significant.  But it is 
more than that.  The absence of engagement with a central question in the case is 
just one more sign that religious exemption cases involve the worst kind of 
judicial lawmaking, unguided by what has gone before, or by manageable 
standards for what should come next.  The final issue the Court confronts – the 
issue on which the future of the contraceptive mandate now turns – reveals this 
sort of ad hoc, all things considered, “no case controls another” form of 
adjudication for which the field is now justly infamous. 
D. “Least Restrictive Alternative”  
203 Hobby Lobby, Kennedy concurrence, slip op. at 2. 
204 Marks v. U.S. , 430 U.S. 188 (1977)  (in the absence of a majority opinion, the narrowest opinion in support of 
the result represents the controlling law). 
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Some of the instant commentary on Hobby Lobby suggested that the 
disposition of the case, on grounds that the government had alternatives less 
restrictive of religious liberty than the challenged mandate, had been driven by 
Justice Kennedy’s hope and expectation of an ultimate win-win result.205  And 
win-win is what we may get, if that is the right label for a result in which the 
government’s accommodation of religiously affiliated non-profits is a) extended 
by the Obama Administration to for-profit firms like Hobby Lobby, and b) upheld 
in the Supreme Court, perhaps as early as next Term, in which the Court is likely 
to hear University of Notre Dame v. Burwell.206 
If the Court upholds application to objecting religious non-profits of this 
accommodation, under which affected women receive full contraceptive 
coverage through third party administrators and health insurers outside of the 
employer policy, women may be inconvenienced but not deprived of coverage.  
And religious objectors will be spared the obligation to purchase the coverage, 
though they will not be spared an association through a series of orders and 
contracts with the fact of coverage.  Whether either side sees that as a win is a 
matter of dispute.  In any event, the Court’s hotly contested disposition, just three 
days after the Hobby Lobby decision, of an injunction request from Wheaton 
College207 suggests that such an ultimate outcome remains in considerable 
doubt.208 
Before returning to the operative details, I want to put the analysis of a “least 
restrictive alternative” in Hobby Lobby in a broader constitutional perspective, as 
well as a broader RFRA perspective.  First, the notion of alternative, more 
constitutionally sensitive means to the same end is widespread in constitutional 
law.  One sees it, for very recent example, in McCullen v. Coakley,209 this Term’s 
decision about the thirty-five foot buffer zone outside abortion clinics; five 
Justices concluded that the constitutional defect in the Massachusetts law was its 
205 For this characterization of the Kennedy view, see Martin Lederman,  
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/06/hobby-lobby-part-xvii-upshot-of.html 
206 University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F. 3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014), aff’g, No. 3:13–cv–01276–PPS, 2013 WL 
6804773 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 20, 2013). 
207 Wheaton College v. Burwell, U.S., No. 13A1284, July 3. 2014, available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13a1284_ap6c.pdf. 
208 Martin Lederman, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/07/what-next-in-wheaton-college-is-it-also.html 
209  U.S.. No. 12-1168, http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-1168_6k47.pdf.  
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overbreadth.210  A smaller zone, or (narrower still) a firm police presence aimed at 
stopping physical obstruction of patients, might adequately protect access to 
abortion clinics while permitting more speech.  And one sees similar moves in the 
demand for exploration of race-neutral alternatives to race-specific admission 
policies in universities;211 again, the notion is that government may achieve its 
legitimate ends with means that do less damage to constitutionally protected 
values.   
The Supreme Court has made such moves for a half-century or more.212  
Notice, however, that trade-offs are always in play when the Court insists on less 
drastic alternatives or more narrowly tailored means to legitimate ends.  A sturdy 
police presence, designed to prevent obstruction of access to abortion clinics will 
leave unchecked more speech than a thirty-five foot “no speech” zone around the 
building, but the cost will be less protection for the patients’ peace of mind at a 
moment of great stress.  A “top 10%”admission plan will, in some states, produce 
decent racial and ethnic diversity in a student body, but may undercut optimizing 
the overall quality of an entering class.213   The results are never fully win-win; 
instead, they are redistributive in foreseeable and unforeseeable ways. 
Moreover, these doctrines never truly insist that the government use the 
LEAST restrictive means to its ends.  Any coercive means can be replaced by a 
non-coercive one.  Abortion protestors could be offered government benefits in 
exchange for ending their harassing protests in front of clinics; or, even less 
“restrictive,” public officials could politely ask the protestors to cut it out.  At 
some point along the range of less restrictive policy choices, the means become 
politically infeasible, useless, or both. 
Within RFRA itself, the adoption of the strenuous formula or “least restrictive 
means” highlights the question (flagged at the Introduction to this Part III) of 
whether Congress was restoring pre-Smith free exercise norms, or restoring 
“religious liberty” by legislating new, more aggressive norms.  In Sherbert, the 
Court had insisted that government avoid gratuitous, religion-suppressing 
210  Id. at 18-29 (slip op.). 
211  See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 335-337 (2003) (discussion of 10% plan as a race-neutral alternative 
to race-specific admissions policies at Univ. of Michigan Law School).  
212 The subject is hardly new.  See Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 Yale L.J. 464 (1969); 
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844 (1970). 
213 See Fisher v. University of Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
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overbreadth – for example, rather than rejecting all religion-based claims to 
unemployment compensation because some may be fraudulent, the government 
must inquire on a case-by-case base into the sincerity of each claim.214  When the 
Court began to weaken the force of the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine in the 1980’s, 
however, it backed away from deploying such a requirement of narrow tailoring, 
or case-by-case adjudication, across the board.  This retreat was most prominent 
in U.S. v. Lee,215 where the Court cited the concept of means “essential to 
accomplish an overriding governmental interest,”216 while steadfastly refusing to 
insist that the government deploy such means in the case of Old Order Amish 
seeking exemption from FICA contributions for their Amish employees.217  
In Hobby Lobby, Justices Alito and Ginsburg duel on the connection between 
the scope of the “least restrictive means” provision and the larger question of 
what RFRA restores.  Relying on the statutory language, Alito asserts that RFRA 
goes beyond the prior free exercise law;218 relying on legislative history, Ginsburg 
insists that RFRA incorporates the pre-Smith gloss, and goes no further.219  In 
Ginsburg’s view, the “least restrictive means” must be “equally effective 
means”220 in order to qualify under the statute, and, in the context of the 
contraceptive mandate, no alternatives are likely to be equally effective. 
On the availability of workable alternatives, however, Justice Alito has the 
votes of all the Justices who joined his majority opinion.  His opinion asserts that 
“[t]he most straightforward way of [providing an alternative less restrictive of 
religious liberty] would be for the Government to assume the cost of providing 
the four contraceptives at issue to any women who are unable to obtain them 
under their health-insurance policies due to their employers' religious 
objections.”221 
214 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1963). 
215 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
216 Id. at 257-258.  See also Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (“The state may justify an 
inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state 
interest.”) 
217 Congress eventually created just such an exemption, 26 U.S.C. sec. 3127(a)(2), (b)(1), referenced in Hobby 
Lobby, Ginsburg dissent, slip op. at 32, n. 29.  
218  Hobby Lobby, slip op. at 47-48, and note 43. 
219 Hobby Lobby, Ginsburg, J., dissenting, slip op. at 31-35. 
220 Id. at 27. 
221 Hobby Lobby, slip op. at 41. 
 52 
                                                          
It is unlikely in the extreme that Congress will appropriate funds to pay for 
the contraceptives to which Hobby Lobby and other firms (some of which object 
to all contraceptive methods) object on religious grounds, so this alternative may 
somehow be theoretically adequate but politically impossible.222  If such options 
count in the calculus of “least restrictive means,” the government will never 
prevail when a person is “substantially burdened” by a program that involves 
provision of goods, rather than the elimination of harms.  The provision of goods 
– vaccinations, minimum wages, and the entire stock of benefit-creating policies – 
can always be accomplished by direct government expenditure rather than forced 
regulatory transfers among private parties.  
 Aside from the alternative of direct provision, the contraceptive mandate 
deck includes a crucial wild card as another potential alternative.  Justice Alito’s 
opinion reminds us that “HHS itself has demonstrated that it has at its disposal an 
approach that is less restrictive than requiring employers to fund contraceptive 
methods that violate their religious beliefs. . . . HHS has already established an 
accommodation for nonprofit organizations with religious objections.”223   
Does RFRA protect religious objectors against application of that 
accommodation? The Court opinion is fully noncommittal:224 
 “We do not decide today whether an approach of this type complies with 
RFRA for purposes of all religious claims. At a minimum, however, it does not 
impinge on the plaintiffs' religious belief that providing insurance coverage for the 
contraceptives at issue here violates their religion, and it serves HHS's stated 
interests equally well.” 
 Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion seems even more emphatic in its 
conclusion that the government may not mandate direct insurance coverage of 
these contraceptives when it has already made an accommodation, for religious 
non-profits, that provides the relevant pregnancy prevention services while 
222  The opinion goes on to make the highly controversial suggestion that RFRA itself may authorize the Executive 
Branch to spend money as a way of financing this alternative. Hobby Lobby, slip op. at 41-43.  This is an entirely 
novel, and I think wholly unsupportable, suggestion.  RFRA is not an authorizing statute. Its basic rule protects 
persons against certain religious burdens, and it blocks exceptions to that rule in cases where alternative ways of 
achieving government ends exist.  But RFRA does nothing to authorize, much less require, the government to act in 
those alternative ways.  When alternatives involve affirmative authorization of expenditures and appropriations of 
money, the Executive Branch must depend on Congress.  
223 Hobby Lobby, slip op. at 43. 
224 Id. at 44 (notes omitted). 
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impinging less on the objectors’ religious beliefs.225  He seems skeptical, however, 
that direct government provision of contraceptive coverage should be considered 
as an available, less restrictive alternative, when the existing accommodation for 
non-profits can be extended and satisfy all.226 
 So, as orchestra leader Ted Lewis used to ask his audience, “Is everybody 
happy?”227  No.  Not a single Justice of the five in the majority has committed to 
the legality of this accommodation under RFRA.  The Alito opinion’s emphasis on 
a direct government payment program suggests that at least four of those who 
joined it have substantial doubts with respect to the validity of the 
accommodation as applied to non-profits.  Justice Kennedy’s opinion, and the 
clever swerve around the compelling interest question that he effectively forced, 
suggests that he believes the accommodation is valid under RFRA as applied to 
for-profits, though he may well have doubts about its validity when applied to 
non-profits.  The outcome of any litigation concerning the accommodation of 
non-profits thus remains uncertain, and will continue to be for at least another 
year.  
 Moreover, there is no guarantee that the Obama Administration will be 
able to extend the accommodation to for-profits.  For HHS to do so will require an 
extended notice and comment period for a new regulatory obligation, and many 
third-party administrators, health insurers, and for-profit firms like Hobby Lobby 
will push back hard against the effort.  
Indeed, Hobby Lobby and others are highly likely to litigate under RFRA 
against such an accommodation if it is ultimately provided.  They are likely to 
assert that they are substantially burdened by any arrangement that makes them 
cooperate – even by formally announcing their objection to their third party 
225 Hobby Lobby, Kennedy concurring, slip op. at 3-4. 
226 Id. at 4: “The parties who were the plaintiffs in the District Courts argue that the Government could pay for the 
methods that are found objectionable. . . . In discussing this alternative, the Court does not address whether the 
proper response to a legitimate claim for freedom in the health care arena is for the Government to create an 
additional program. . . . The Court properly does not resolve whether one freedom should be protected by creating 
incentives for additional government constraints. In these cases, it is the Court's understanding that an 
accommodation may be made to the employers without imposition of a whole new program or burden on the 
Government. As the Court makes clear, this is not a case where it can be established that it is difficult to 
accommodate the government's interest, and in fact the mechanism for doing so is already in place.” (citations 
omitted.) 
227 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ted_Lewis_(musician) 
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insurance administrator -- in the provision of coverage.  They may even argue 
more broadly that they are substantially burdened when the government makes 
their employment of someone a but-for cause of contraceptive coverage to which 
they object.  Accordingly, they may assert that the still less restrictive alternative 
of a direct government program is fatal to any program that implicates an 
employer more directly.  Whether there will be five votes for or against that 
position, at the time it may be advanced in the Supreme Court, is impossible to 
predict. So assuming a win-win outcome, based on an accommodation that has 
not yet been offered and remains questionable under RFRA, seems more like a 
leap of faith than a reasoned prediction. 
 More dubious, however, is the entire enterprise of religious exemptions, of 
which Hobby Lobby is but a sub-part. Look at where we have ended up.  Four 
Justices may well be ready to insist that direct government provision is the only 
lawful way to provide contraceptive coverage with respect to objecting employers 
(or objecting universities, with respect to students).  Four others were ready to 
rule in favor of the contraceptive mandate as applied to Hobby Lobby.  One – only 
one – effectively held out for adjudication of the validity of alternatives.   
More generally, not a single Justice has an approach to RFRA, and an 
accompanying methodology of interpretation, that will square its history with its 
text, or produce a consistent practice of drawing on pre-Smith decisions as a 
guide to interpretation of RFRA.  Alito and others in the majority like Thomas; 
Ginsburg and other dissenters are drawn to Lee.  Lower courts adjudicating RFRA 
cases in the future can be forgiven for being completely unsure of where to go 
from here. 
IV. Religious Exemptions in the Wake of Hobby Lobby 
Parts I-II of the paper have argued that regimes of religious exemptions will be 
rhetorically strong, experientially weak, and hopelessly erratic.  Seen against the 
backdrop painted in Part III, Hobby Lobby portends a RFRA regime that some 
expect to be fresh and vigorous, but will turn out to be neither. 
The Court itself seemed mindful to limit the scope of its ruling.  The opinion 
suggests that other health insurance coverage will not so easily be escaped under 
RFRA.  As Justice Alito wrote, any religious objection to coverage of vaccinations, 
blood transfusions, or other treatments must be analyzed with respect to its 
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particular impact.228  If the covered procedure involves life and death, or serious 
contagious disease, the government’s interest in full and immediate coverage will 
inevitably trump any religious objections. 229 
Business firms may have financial incentives to raise RFRA objections to other 
regulation of the employment relationship, including wage and hour rules,230 the 
Family and Medical Leave Act,231 or the Americans with Disabilities Act.232  But the 
presence of such financial incentives will be a powerful danger signal that 
religious insincerity lurks behind such claims.  Courts should demand evidence of 
corporate religious sincerity in full proportion to the financial gain a RFRA victory 
would yield.  The contraceptive mandate involves a perfect storm of strong 
religious convictions, the possibility of working out alternative arrangements, and 
no apparent financial incentive for firms to raise insincere claims.  This 
combination of circumstances is not likely to recur, and, if the past is any guide to 
the future, imperfect storms are highly likely to lead to government victories in 
RFRA cases, especially when the religious objectors are commercial actors.  The 
Court has inflicted no more than a flesh wound to the Lee dictum that commercial 
actors may not use their religious convictions to evade regulation. 
What about civil rights cases, especially those that involve employer objections 
to paying family benefits to employees with same sex spouses?  This is the next 
wave of RFRA possibilities,233 and there is good reason to be concerned about it.  
In Hobby Lobby, Justice Ginsburg’s dissent asked pointedly whether RFRA would 
require exemptions in cases where commercial businesses asserted religious 
reasons to discriminate based on race, religion, sex, or sexual orientation.234 
228 Hobby Lobby, slip. op. at 45-46. 
229 There have been no RFRA or free exercise claims to such coverage under the ACA.  One primary reason for this 
may be that those who object to such procedures do so only with respect to themselves and their family members, 
and do not object to the coverage of others who consent to such treatment. 
230 In Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985), a unanimous Court rejected a free 
exercise clause objection to application of the wage, overtime, and recordkeeping requirements of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. sec. 201 et seq. 
231 29 U.S.C. sec. 2601 et seq. 
232  42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq. 
233 Professor Tuttle and I flagged this immediately after the decision.  Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle, Hobby Lobby in 
the Long Run, http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/rfp/blog/hobby-lobby-in-the-long-run.  See also Ira C. Lupu, 
Hobby Lobby Endangers Same Sex Benefits, http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202661872503?. 
234 Hobby Lobby, Ginsburg dissent, slip op. at 32-33. 
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Justice Alito’s direct rejoinder mentioned race and race alone.235 That response 
conspicuously left open the possibility that he and others who joined him might 
hospitably entertain RFRA objections when other grounds of discrimination are 
involved. 
  This line of concern would be serious indeed if Hobby Lobby is the full 
invigoration of RFRA that it appears to be.  If the past is prologue, however, the 
lower federal courts are not likely to take much of this bait.  I think it 
unimaginable that a RFRA claim by a commercial business to be free to 
discriminate in employment based on religion or sex, in violation of Title VII, 
would be taken seriously.  The government has very strong interests in prohibiting 
such discrimination, and absolutely no “less restrictive means” are available to 
deal with the resulting harms. 
What about discrimination based on sexual orientation?  This context is highly 
likely to present the next cutting edge of RFRA claims. The question could come 
up immediately under the Family and Medical Leave Act, if an employer objects 
on religious grounds to an employee who seeks leave to care for a same-sex 
spouse.  More sweepingly, if and when Congress enacts a version of the proposed 
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (“ENDA”),236 some employers may refuse on 
religious grounds to hire someone who is openly LGBT or, perhaps more likely, 
refuse to provide any family benefits with respect to a same sex spouse.  Will 
RFRA, or any other legal authority, provide such an employer with a legally 
sufficient defense? 
Soon after the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision, a major part of the 
LGBT rights coalition withdrew its support for any broad exemption, from the 
currently proposed ENDA,237 for religious non-profit entities.238 One reason the 
235 Hobby Lobby, slip op. , at p. 46: “The principal dissent raises the possibility that discrimination in hiring, for 
example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal sanction. See post, at 32-33. 
Our decision today provides no such shield. The Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal 
opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are 
precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal.” 
236  113th Congress, H.R. 1755; 113th Congress, S. 815.  For more information, see generally 
http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/employment-non-discrimination-act. 
237  113th Congress, H.R. 1755, https://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/1755 (includes provision 
making it inapplicable to religious organizations). 
238 See Chris Geidner, Three Reasons LGBT Groups are Fighting Over a Bill That Isn’t Going to Become Law, 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/chrisgeidner/three-reasons-lgbt-groups-are-fighting-over-a-bill-that-isnt. 
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withdrawing groups cited was the possibility that Hobby Lobby would encourage 
RFRA objections to ENDA by for-profit firms, and that those objections might be 
strengthened if ENDA exempts religious non-profits.239  This apprehension is 
entirely reasonable, even though the government’s interest in barring LGBT 
discrimination in employment is very strong, and less restrictive means to prevent 
or cure the harms of such discrimination are totally unavailable. 
What about the religious non-profits themselves?  How would they fare under 
an ENDA that did not broadly exclude them?  Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
(which ENDA would amend) already includes a provision that exempts religious 
organizations from the prohibition on employment discrimination based on 
religion.240  Religious non-profit entities made subject to ENDA might argue that 
they were free to discriminate against LGBT people if the employer’s faith 
tradition condemned same sex intimacy as sinful.  But Section 702 has never been 
construed to permit discrimination against a group specifically protected by the 
Civil Rights Act.241  Without an ENDA-specific exception, these employers would 
have to look elsewhere for a defense. 
RFRA and Hobby Lobby is where such employers are most likely to look. Any 
attempt to rely on RFRA as a defense to an action under a broad ENDA, however, 
is doomed to fail.  To be sure, the non-profit religious objectors are likely to be 
able to show that they are sincere, and that they are substantially burdened in 
their religious exercise by such an enactment. But the government’s interests in 
covering such employers would be just as compelling as its interests in covering 
for-profit employers, and there remains no alternative less restrictive than 
prohibition to block the harms caused by the discrimination.  
What of the more imminent scenario of an Executive Order barring such 
discrimination by federal contractors?242  This would not have the imprimatur of 
Congress, so perhaps religiously objecting employers, relying on RFRA, would 
argue that the government’s interest is short of compelling.  I think that 
239 Id. 
240 Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 702, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-1.  The Supreme Court upheld this provision 
against Establishment Clause challenge in Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
241 See, e.g., Memo. from U.S. Ass’t Att’y Gen. (2000), 30-32 and accompanying cites, available at  
http://balkin.blogspot.com/olc.charitablechoice.pdf. 
242  Jonathan Capehart, Obama to Sign Executive Order Protecting LGBT Federal Contractors, Washington Post, 
June 16, 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2014/06/16/obama-to-sign-
executive-order-protecting-lgbt-federal-contractors/. 
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institution-based argument lacks substance, and should fail.  In any event, there is 
no reason to believe it would have five votes on the current Supreme Court.   
Should any such Executive Order include a broad and categorical exemption 
for religious non-profits? That is now a matter of fierce political debate. A group 
of faith leaders have called on the President to include such an exemption in the 
Executive Order.243 Other faith leaders and a group of legal scholars, myself 
included, have urged the President to issue the Order without any such 
exemption.244  In this context, all the arguments above (re: ENDA) about the 
Section 702 exemption, RFRA claims and defenses, and the risk that for-profits 
will try to exploit the Hobby Lobby decision to piggy-back on an exemption for 
religious entities play out exactly the same way.  Moreover, with respect to both 
the Executive Order and ENDA, a RFRA-driven exemption for commercial 
businesses would protect hard-to-ferret-out bigotry, rather than sincere religious 
conviction.  All of these legal bases for religion-based exemption should fail. 
What remains are the possible copy-cat effects of Hobby Lobby on the 
interpretation of state RFRAs.  Might such statutes now be construed to protect 
religiously motivated discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation, 
or discrimination by wedding vendors (or merchants in other contexts) against 
same sex couples?  Perhaps.  But recall several observations from earlier in this 
article.  State RFRAs have been construed very weakly.245  It is obviously possible, 
as my colleagues and I suggested in our letter to the Mississippi legislature,246 that 
Hobby Lobby will indeed generate imitative interpretations by state courts, 
particularly on the question of corporate religious personhood.  Even if that were 
243 Michelle Boorstein, Faith Leaders: Exempt Religious Groups from Order Barring LGBT Bias in Hiring, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/faith-leaders-exempt-religious-groups-from-order-barring-lgbt-bias-in-
hiring/2014/07/02/d82e68da-01f1-11e4-b8ff-89afd3fad6bd_story.html.  Their letters are here: 
http://www.irfalliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/LGBT-EO-letter-to-President-6-25-2014-w-additional-
signatures.pdf (June 25, 2014); http://www.scribd.com/doc/232327567/Religious-Exemption-Letter-to-President-
Obama (July 1, 2014). 
244 See 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/8wzzpbviygds1pv/Faith%20Letter%20to%20President%20Defending%20Exec%20Ord
er%202014-07-08%20FINAL.pdf (letter, dated July 8, 2014, to President Barack Obama from faith leaders, urging 
no exclusion of religious entities from the proposed order);  
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/gender-sexuality/executive_order_letter_final_0.pdf 
 (letter, dated July 14, 2014, to President Barack Obama from legal scholars, likewise urging no exclusion of 
religious entities). 
245 See Part II.C., supra, and reliance there on the work of Professor Lund. 
246 See TAN ___ supra, in Part I. 
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to occur, however, the states with RFRAs tend overwhelmingly to be the states 
that do not forbid discrimination in employment, or in sale of goods or services, 
based on sexual orientation.247  That’s not a happy omission, but it does mean, in 
the short run, that many states lack such civil rights provisions against which their 
RFRAs might operate.   
Same sex marriage is likely to arrive, by virtue of judicial decisions under the 
fourteenth amendment,248 in these states sooner than state or local anti-
discrimination law for the LGBT population.  But if recent history is a guide, such a 
development in the constitutional law relating to marriage may be more likely to 
provoke protective anti-discrimination laws than to provoke RFRA interpretations 
that license otherwise unlawful discrimination.  The public outcry against 
Arizona’s proposed religious freedom amendments in early 2014, and the 
continuing backlash against Mississippi RFRA,249 suggests that elected judges will 
think twice before interpreting a state RFRA to permit otherwise unlawful LGBT 
discrimination by commercial actors. 
As Archibald Cox wisely wrote many years ago, “once loosed, the idea of 
Equality is not easily cabined.”250  We are witnesses to that proposition playing 
out with respect to marriage equality.  I make no claim to be nearly so wise as the 
late Professor Cox.  But my detailed appraisal of various systems of religious 
exemption – federal and state, constitutional and statutory – suggests strongly 
that religious exemptions are in fact rarely loosed and thereafter quite readily 
cabined.  To accomplish this, the courts may rely on narrowing interpretations of 
substantial burden,251 though that now seems unlikely as a first move. The courts 
247 By my count, only three states – Connecticut, Illinois, and New Mexico – have both RFRAs AND anti-
discrimination laws that protect LGBT people.   The New Mexico overlap helps explain the state law conflict in the 
Elane Photography case described in note ___, supra.   I derived this count by comparing the list of state RFRAs, in 
Lund, note __ supra, 55 S.D. L. Rev. 466, 477, n. 6  and Table I (2010)(listing 16 states with RFRAs) with the list of 
states that protect LGBT people against various forms of discrimination in Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: 
Same Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1169, 1190, n.66 (2012) (listing 21 states and the District of Columbia as having laws prohibiting 
discrimination against LGBT people).  Since these two articles were published, I believe the only change in either 
list is the addition of the Mississippi RFRA described in Part I, supra. 
248  See decisions cited in n. __, supra. 
249 See note __, supra (describing the quickly spreading merchants’ campaign in Mississippi to promote 
nondiscriminatory treatment of customers). 
250  Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term – Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of 
Human Rights, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 91 (1966). 
251 This was a typical confining move in the early days of RFRA, especially in prison cases.  See Ira C. Lupu, The 
Failure of RFRA, 20 U. Ark. at Little Rock L.J.  575, 593-596 (1998). 
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more likely will be generous to the government in determining what counts as a 
compelling interest, and in refusing to force a weakening of government policy 
through emphasis on the availability of less restrictive means.  In addition, for 
Establishment Clause reasons or otherwise, the courts may become increasingly 
drawn to RFRA interpretations that limit the costs that RFRA claimants can 
impose on private third parties. Whatever the judicial moves, the dubious 
enterprise of religious exemptions will, yet again, shrivel rather than prosper. 
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